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1. INTRODUCTION
This comment will seek to consider the ramifications upon the
Polish nation and economy of its failure to implement a significant
number of European Union ("EU") directives. More generally, it
will examine the effectiveness of the current compliance-based
regulatory model employed by the EU to create the world's most
competitive economy and whether the administrative homogeneity
endorsed by the EU will be effective in promoting economic pro-
gress in light of the Polish case. In addition, the comparative ad-
vantages of possible legal and policy-based alternatives to the
compliance-based directive model will be considered.
Section 2 is devoted to discussing the process of EU enlarge-
ment, specifically, the problems encountered in admitting ten new
members, and the regulatory approach employed in order to ame-
liorate national differences. Section 3 looks specifically at Poland,
which has failed to implement a significant number of directives,
and the causes for and effects of these transpositional deficiencies
in the short-term. Section 4 considers the long-term effects of these
failures, arguing that Polish compliance with certain directives is
essential to the achievement of long-term developmental goals
while non-compliance with other measures may actually prove
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beneficial and underscore problems in the European Union's cur-
rent system of governance. Section 5 considers the implications of
this analysis on the regulatory model and suggests that a more di-
versified approach is preferred to the current reliance on a largely
compliance-based model.
2. EU ENLARGEMENT
2.1. Enlargement Considerations
At present, the EU is in a stage of radical evolution. The Union
originally began as the European Coal and Steel Community in
19511 with just six countries -Germany, France, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, but, with the recent accession of
ten Central European countries, the EU now boasts twenty-five
members and stretches from Portugal to Poland. Numerically, the
recent addition of ten nations marks the biggest expansion that the
EU or its predecessor institutions has ever experienced.2 More-
over, and perhaps more importantly, the new additions to the EU
are marked by significant social, political, and economic differ-
ences, as compared to the existing members.3 The new EU entrants
are significantly poorer than existing members, with average GDP
1 See Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC),
Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
2 Enlargement will be significant on a number of fronts- increasing the num-
ber of members by 66% to 25, increasing the land mass by 19% or 4 million square
kilometers, and increasing the population by 20% to over 450 million inhabitants.
See ANCA PUSCA, EUROPEAN UNION: CHALLENGES AND PROMISES OF A NEW
ENLARGEMENT 73 (2004).
3 Anca Pusca notes three key differences between the most recent EU
enlargement and previous expansions: (1) income levels in many of the newly
admitted countries are considerably lower than that of existing members, (2) the
new admittees only recently transitioned from a centrally planned to a market
economy, and (3) the volume of EU legislation that these new members are hav-
ing to adopt is far more extensive than in previous enlargements due to enhance-
ments in the Single Market. See id. at 160. Differences between new and existing
EU members are not limited to the economic realm but are also evidence in the
social arena. See Adam Michnik, The Conversation with Leszek Kolakowski, GAZETA
WYBORCZA [CONSTITUENT GAZETTE], Nov. 21-22, 1992 ("At the beginning was this
idea: we are coming back to Europe.... But a moment later appeared the thesis
that we had no reason to come back to Europe. First we were in it the whole time;
secondly, this Europe is not so beautiful. Because Europe means relativism, god-
lessness, drugs, pornography, abortions, divorces, homosexuality -in one word -
Babylon, Sodom and Gomorra.").
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per person at only half that of existing member states.4 According
to World Bank reports, it could take more than twenty years for the
Central-Eastern European ("CEE") countries, including Poland, to
reach the EU's average level of 1994 GDP per capita.5 These eco-
nomic and social shortcomings have raised considerable concerns
among existing and new members about the manner in which in-
tegration into the Union should proceed. As a single market based
on free circulation and integrated activity, the EU is particularly
vulnerable to the lingering problems that characterize its new
members.
6
Consequently, the EU devoted considerable time and resources
to negotiating the precise terms of entry with applicant nations, in
the hope of controlling the manner and effect of accession on the
new states as well as on the EU as a whole.7 Preparation began in
4 EU Gets Bigger, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May 1, 2004; see also U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2005, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/200lrank.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2006) (indicating that the GDP of Poland in 2005 was only $468 bil-
lion, while that of the EU at the same time amounted to more than $12 trillion).
5 See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1996: FROM PLAN TO
MARKET 43 (1996) ("Most estimates based on actual conditions in Germany place
the catch-up period for eastern Germany at between ten and twenty years; by im-
plication, the catch-up period for the CEE countries and the NIS would be longer,
because they lack eastern Germany's favorable initial conditions and rich 'big
brother.'"); cf. A Club in Need of a New Vision, ECONOMIST, May 1-7, 2004 (referenc-
ing forecasts that indicate it will take Poland "59 years to catch up with the EU
average of GDP per head").
6 The freedoms underpinning the EU are the freedom of establishment, free-
dom of services, and free movement of goods, services, and capital. Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community arts. 48-73, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. A European Commission White Paper explic-
itly stated the importance of legal and economic uniformity within a system char-
acterized by such freedom. See Commission White Paper on Preparation of the Associ-
ated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration into the Internal Market of
the Union, at 8-9, COM (1995) 163 final (May 3, 1995) [hereinafter White Paper]
("An internal market without frontiers relies on a high level of mutual confidence
and on equivalence of regulatory approach. Any substantial failure to apply the
common rules in any part of the internal market puts the rest of the system at risk
and undermines its integrity.").
7 By most accounts, the negotiations and requirements involved in the most
recent round of EU expansion were considerably more elaborate and stringent
than those of any preceding expansion. Negotiations were preceded by an elabo-
rate screening process designed to elucidate areas in which each candidate coun-
try already approximated EU norms and standards and those in which further
convergence was required. Negotiations were then begun on the specific terms
and conditions of entry as well as on transitional periods for conformity with the
most expensive EU policies. The European Commission was assigned the task of
monitoring candidate efforts at conformity and issuing annual reports on appli-
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June 1993, when the European Council declared that all of the Cen-
tral European nations that entered into Europe Agreements might
ultimately join the European Union, provided that they satisfied
three pre-conditions (the "Copenhagen criteria"): 1) stable institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy and the rule of law, with full respect
for fundamental human rights and the protection of minorities; 2) a
functional market economy, with free market competition, and the
ability to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within
the Union; and 3) the ability and the administrative infrastructure
necessary to fulfill all of the obligations of membership.
8
2.2. Establishing a Regulatory Framework
The EU followed up this mission statement by requiring CEE
countries seeking EU membership to converge with and maintain
the acquis communautaire, namely the whole body of political, insti-
tutional, and legislative achievements of the existing EU.9 Acquis
communautaire is not defined legally but rather is a term of art that
originates from articles 2 and 3 of the EC Treaty.' ° The phrase en-
compasses not only the primary and secondary law of the EU, but
also Court of Justice decisions and the EU's institutional legal obli-
gations. 1 Some scholars have argued that the acquis communautaire
encompasses even the general policies of the EU and the adminis-
trative capacity to implement and enforce them.12 The vast body of
cant performance to this end. Accession requirements, negotiations, and progress
were memorialized in a variety of documents, including position papers, the
White Paper, Agenda 2000, and the Europe Agreements. See JOHN VAN
OUDENAREN, UNITING EUROPE: INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION 62 (2d ed.
2005) (describing the various stages of the most recent expansion negotiation
process).
8 EUR. COMM'N, EU ENLARGEMENT-A HIsTORIc OPPORTUNITY,
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/intro/criteria.htm (last visited Feb. 18,
2006) (delineating the Copenhagen requirements).
9 For the purpose of negotiation with each accession country, the acquis com-
munautaire was divided into 31 main chapters including agriculture, competition
policy, external commercial and trade regulations, economic and monetary union,
environmental protection, social policy, transport, common foreign and security
policy, and cooperation in justice affairs. Roger J. Goebel, Joining the European Un-
ion: The Accession Procedure for the Central European and Mediterranean States, 1 LoY.
U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 15, 37 (2005).
10 Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J.
(C340) 3 [hereinafter EC Treaty].
11 See F. EMMERT & M. MORAWIECKI, PRAWO EUROPEJSKIE [EUROPEAN RIGHTS]
412 (1999) (describing the concept of acquis communautaire).
12 See Jerzy Sommer, The Organizational and Legal Instruments Available for
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acquis communautaire is comprised of a variety of specific legal and
legislative measures, including EU regulations and directives.
Directives, although theoretically vague in nature, have become
relatively specific in reality and proven instrumental in elucidating
an accession program 13 for new members and harmonizing diver-
gences in the integrating markets.14 Article 189 of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Economic Community ("EEC Treaty") de-
fines directives flexibly and provides that a "[d]irective shall bind
any Member State to which they are addressed, as to the result to
be achieved, while leaving to domestic agencies a competence as to
form and means." 15 Therefore, unlike regulations, directives re-
quire the formal support of the legislature of the implementing na-
tion. Theoretically at least, the actual detail and method of imple-
mentation is to be left to the member state, so that its own domestic
legislation can be amended as appropriate to achieve the goal of
harmonization described in the directive. Essentially, "transposi-
tion of the directive into national laws and the choice of the 'most
appropriate forms and methods' of administrative application
were expected, with the European Commission and the European
Court of Justice empowered with the right to judge and punish
transgressors." 16 As a result, directives now perform the bulk of
Harmonizing Polish Environmental law with EC Environmental Law, in REFORM IN
CEE-COuNTRIES wrrH REGARD TO EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT 29, 30 (Michael Schmidt
& Lothar Knopp eds., 2004) (arguing that the acquis communautaire may be con-
strued to encompass both EU policies and their implementation).
13 In addition to directives, the White Paper contained a detailed appendix of
about 438 pages that was designed to serve as a strategic roadmap for candidate
governments as they worked to align domestic legislation and practice with EU
norms. Specifically, the Commission provided an overview of existing legislation
and of key measures that needed to be implemented in applicant states to facili-
tate alignment. See White Paper, supra note 6.
14 See Sofia Arana Landin, Abuse of Law Within the European Union, in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 81, 81 (Malgorzata Krol ed., 1999). In her arti-
cle she writes:
Steps are being taken in order to harmonise up to a point different as-
pects of law within the Union. They sometimes take the form of Direc-
tives, others of Conventions but notwithstanding the form adopted, they
have the purpose of being applied by Member States in order to achieve
a certain harmonisation in specific matters that can be considered to be
problematic for the common market.
Id.
15 EEC Treaty art. 189.
16 FRANCEscO G. DUINA, HARMONIZING EUROPE 5 (1999); see also Isabella Mar-
tin, The Limitations to the Implementation of a Uniform Environmental Policy in the
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internal market regulation in the EU, and entrepreneurs must look
to them to ensure legal compliance.' 7 In their specificity and their
deep reach into the economies and administrative structures of
member states, directives have gone beyond market harmonization
to effect market re-regulation. 18 Indeed, the Madrid European
Council specifically required candidate countries to modify their
administrative agencies and judicial structures to comply with di-
rectives through a showing not only of implementing legislation
but also of the existence of a bureaucratic structure that supports
application.19
Re-regulation through directives represents an interesting de-
parture from traditional EU administration, one designed to afford
existing EU members a greater degree of control over the new
member's assimilation into the existing EU entity. 20 In general, the
traditional EU approach to differing national regulatory schemes is
based on the principal of mutual recognition, as developed by the
European Court of Justice in cases such as Cassis de Dijon.21 Mutual
recognition posits on an equivalence-based regulatory model,
whereby a product, for instance, manufactured and tested accord-
ing to one nation's regulations is deemed to satisfy and comply
with the standards of a partner nation. 22 The mutual recognition
European Union, 9 CONN. J. INT'L L. 675, 695-703 (1994) (describing the procedure
involved in directive implementation with respect to environmental legislation).
17 See Francis G. Jacobs, General Editor's Foreword to SACHA PRECHAL,
DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW, at vii (2d ed. 2005) (underscoring the increasing importance
of EU directives on the legal and economic landscape of the EU).
18 See PRECHAL, supra note 17, at 3-4 (highlighting that despite the aim of di-
rectives to address a limited number of areas, they may nevertheless have the ef-
fect of expansive legislative acts).
19 See Jill Parker, Comment, West Meets East: A Discussion of European Union
Enlargement and Human Rights, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 603, 606 (2004) (de-
scribing the legal effect and implications of European Union directives in the con-
text of human rights enforcement in the region).
20 Consider, for instance, sentiment among the Slovenian public that "Europe
was run by nation states and [their] interests which at some points challenged the
roots of Slovene sovereignty and its identity" in response to Italy's blockade of
Europe Agreement negotiations with the country. Martin Brusis, Conclusions:
European and National Identities in the Accession Countries - the Role of the European
Union, in NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN EU ENLARGEMENT 195, 205 (Petr
Drulik ed., 2001) (discussing an accession country's suspicion with regard to EU
measures designed to favor existing members).
21 See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur
Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649, 660-63 (striking down a German import prohibition
and elucidating the idea of "mutual recognition").
22 See Paul Brenton, The Economic Impact of Enlargement on the European Econ-
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model retains considerable autonomy for national governments,
which are allowed to determine and apply domestic rules to prod-
ucts and industries so long as these are recognized by fellow states,
meet basic communal requirements, and such recognition is recip-
rocated. 23 The mutual recognition approach employed by existing
EU member states demonstrates considerable trust and respect
among the existing members and facilitates the development of a
single free, yet unified, market.24
In contrast, the imposition of the directive system on recent EU
entrants, designed to harmonize accession state regulatory systems
to existing EU standards, is based on a paradigm of compliance
and convergence. Existing EU member states determine the pre-
vailing norms, principles, and terms of membership and require
that applicant states modify their regulatory frameworks to con-
form to these norms.25 Monitoring of this nature and the imposi-
tion of such highly specific advice did not occur in the case of pre-
vious enlargements. 26 Compliance with directives imposes specific
omy: Problems and Perspectives 6 (Ctr. for European Pol'y Stud., Working Paper
No. 188, 2002), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1821/01/WD188.PDF ("The mutual
recognition approach is based on the idea that products manufactured and tested
in accordance with a partner country's regulations can offer equivalent levels of
protection to those provided by corresponding domestic rules and procedures.").
23 See id. at 13 (describing that "mutual recognition preserves a degree of na-
tional differentiation and allows national governments to implement specific poli-
cies to protect 'the national good"').
24 Id.
25 While the European Commission drafts the EU directives, the standards by
which they are implemented are generated by regional organizations such as the
European Committee for Standardization ("CEN"), the European Committee for
Electrotechnical Standardization ("CENELEC"), and the European Telecommuni-
cations Standards Institute ("ETSI") among others. See R. T. Weightman & Wendy
Buskop, Misunderstanding of EU Directive Requirements Could Have a Significant Im-
pact on Business, ELEVATOR WORLD, May 1, 1999, available at http://www.elevator-
world.com/magazine/archiveOl/9605-003.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (de-
scribing the enforcement bodies responsible for the creation of directives).
26 See PUSCA, supra note 3, at 77 ("It is worth noting that such monitoring and
formulation of specific advice by the EU is an element that was not present in
previous enlargement waves."). See also Brusis, supra note 20, at 197-98. Brusis
states:
Looking back upon the introduction of the regular progress reports and
the Accession Partnerships in 1997, it can be stated that the EU was able
to define wide-ranging accession criteria and make applicant states sub-
ject to a comprehensive and unprecedented monitoring and guidance
exercise. This far-reaching intrusion into the internal affairs of the appli-
cant states was only possible because governments and citizens accepted
the definitional power of the EU, a prerequisite that may become increas-
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requirements on national governments to alter domestic legislation
and regulation to conform with externally imposed mandates.
With regard to the CEE states, specific requirements were issued
pertaining to the liberalization of trade and investment, the free
movement of workers, the adoption of competition rules, and the
adoption of many of the key legislative measures of the internal
market. In fact, the recent applicants had to absorb altogether
80,000 pages of EU law by some estimates.27
Outside of the context of directives, the specificity of accession
conditions is equally noticeable in Agenda 2000, where the Com-
mission gave its opinion on the CEEs' applications for membership
to the Union. Agenda 2000 develops the Copenhagen political and
economic criteria into highly specific requirements with sub-
conditions.28 For instance, economic convergence is evaluated ac-
cording to whether the applicant relies on free market interplay to
establish an equilibrium between demand and supply; whether
prices and trade have been liberalized; whether significant barriers
to market entry and exit have been eliminated; whether a system of
property rights exists; and whether laws and contracts can be en-
forced.29 Beyond the specifics of Agenda 2000, conventional wis-
dom holds that accession depends on unilateral adjustments by
candidate countries towards the adoption of the acquis communau-
ingly disputed in the remaining accession process and even more after
accession.
Id.
27 See Stephen Mulvey, The EU Law that Rules Our Lives, BBC NEWS ONLINE,
Nov. 27, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3241034.stm (last vis-
ited Feb. 2, 2006) ("Ten new EU member states have spent the last four years
ploughing through 80,000 pages of EU law and turning most of it into domestic
legislation.").
28 See Christophe Hillion, The Copenhagen Criteria and Their Progeny, in EU
ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH 1, 11-12 (Christophe Hillion ed., 2004) (dis-
cussing how Agenda 2000 spells out "in more specific terms" the other Copenha-
gen political and economic criteria"). Notably, during the Copenhagen delibera-
tions, France proposed an even more detailed list of criteria, which were not
included in the final communique. See PHEDON NICOLAIDES ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (II): A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS,
NEGOTIATIONS, POLICY REFORMS AND ENFORCEMENT CAPACITY 14 (1999) ("The
'French list' of admission criteria included the following: (a) measurement of eco-
nomic development (in terms of GDP/capita), (b) measurement of market econ-
omy (in terms of privately held assets), (c) quantifiable level of social protection,
(d) control over public debt and inflation, (g) open economy, (h) modem fiscal
system and (i) administrative capacity to implement EU law.").
29 Hillion, supra note 28, at 12.
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taire.30 However, in contrast to previous enlargements where the
EU focused on obtaining post-accession adjustments from new
members, the Union insisted that the bulk of compliance had to be
performed prior to accession, imposing a very explicit condition-
ality on CEE membership.
31
The high-handed re-regulatory approach taken by the EU with
regard to CEE countries suggests an element of disdain for and
condescension towards local decisionmaking. In the words of one
scholar, the "accession negotiations provide another example of
how national European identities in the accession countries are
shaped by the EU and its member states without much considera-
tion about the impact of their policies on the EU's image in the re-
gion."32 More troublingly, directives are often less attuned to
unique national considerations and popular preferences than do-
mestic legislation, imposing specific requirements from above
without sufficient consideration of individual and local issues.
They also place a considerable and complex burden on both ad-
ministrative agencies and individual entrepreneurs. In complying
with a directive, a manufacturing company, for instance, will not
only be forced to consider the directive pertaining to the product it
is creating, but also the broader policy directives that may apply to
its situation, European standards generated by the regulatory
agency responsible for elucidating the directive, and the legislation
employed by the local government to implement the directive.
33
Already, the EU's high regulation density has produced govern-
ance problems.34
Applicant and recently admitted member states remain in the
process of adopting national legislation to conform to EU directives
and regulations in accordance with their obligations under the
Europe Agreements. However, the adoption of so much new legis-
lation has proven to be an onerous task, both administratively and
politically. Moreover, although CEE countries were required to
conform their legislation to the EU model prior to accession and ar-
30 See Helen Wallace, Can a Reformed European Union Bear the Weight of
Enlargement?, in THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE WAKE OF EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 23,
26 (Amy Verdun & Osvaldo Croci eds., 2005) (describing the conventional practi-
tioners' view on whether a reformed EU can bear the weight of enlargement).
31 Id.
32 Brusis, supra note 20, at 205.
33 See PRECHAL, supra note 17, at 3-4 (elaborating upon the functions of direc-
tives within the EC Treaty).
34 See Pusca, supra note 3, at 226.
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ticles 38 and 39 of the Acts of Accession 35 grant the European
Commission power to force the new members to comply with their
pre-accession commitments, full and comprehensive application of
the acquis communautaire and EU directives has yet to occur.36 The
governments of the new member states have demonstrated consid-
erable political might and resilience in stymieing efforts at full im-
plementation of unwelcome EU mandates, and textual transposi-
tion of directives into national law, without real application, has
become commonplace. 37 Recent studies indicate that a significant
gap has developed between the normative level and day-to-day
practice of EU directive adoption in CEE countries. 38
3. THE CASE OF POLISH ACCESSION
3.1. Polish Accession Shortcomings
Poland, in particular, has lagged behind other new members in
adopting and implementing EU directives.39 As of September
2004, Poland had failed to implement two hundred fifty-seven, or
one-sixth of the total number, EU directives regulating the single
35 Articles 38 and 39 of the Act of Accession provide for measures to be taken
if there are "shortcomings" in a new member state's transposition, implementa-
tion, or application of directives post-accession. It is up to the Commission, not
member states, to authorize "appropriate measures," which "may take the form of
temporary suspension of the application of relevant provisions and decisions."
See Treaty of Accession to the European Union 2003 arts. 38-39, Apr. 16, 2003,
2003 O.J. (L236) 33, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargment
/negotiations/treaty of accession_2003/pdf/3_act of accession/aaOO003_reO3_e
n03.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) (outlining safeguards for transposition failures).
36 Some scholars opine that an even more comprehensive strategy of safe-
guards is required to ensure compliance and implementation of directives. See
PRECHAL, supra note 17, at 7 ("Without much exaggeration it can be said that there
is a large area of 'hidden failures' by the Member States which the Commission is
not able to deal with in the more systematic fashion which a successful strategy
for safeguarding compliance would require.").
37 See DUINA, supra note 16, at 7 (stating that the adoption of EU directives in
CEE countries remains superficial).
38 See PUSCA, supra note 3, at 196.
39 See EUR. COMM'N, Composite Paper on the Commission Reports on Progress To-
wards Accession by Each of the Candidate Countries, at 23-24 (Oct. 13, 1999), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_10_99/pdf/en/composite
_en.pdf ("The pace of transposition remains sluggish in Poland .... The slow pace
and piecemeal approach to alignment... is not consistent with [its] political aspi-
rations for rapid succession to the EU."); see also EU Monitor No. 1: Reports on EU
Integration, DEuTscHE BANK RESEARCH, Apr. 2003, at 26 (predicting a convergence
level of only 66.8% for Poland in 2003).
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market.40 In comparison, other accession countries, such as Lithua-
nia, have no more than forty directives outstanding.41 Poland has
failed to fully implement EC directives in a broad range of catego-
ries, including value added tax ("VAT") laws, telecommunications,
municipal services, and foreign business. For instance, Poland's
ban on the advertisement of alcohol (other than beer) violates arti-
cles 14 and 28 of the EU Treaty regarding the free movement of
goods within the internal market due to its disproportionate effect
on foreign distilleries located in other member states.42 Failure to
comply with a directive is considered a breach of treaty that is in-
defensible. Recourse exists only in a declaration by the European
Court of Justice ("ECJ") of the directive itself as invalid. Poland's
failures could lead to a lawsuit against Poland in the ECJ.43 In fact,
on December 14, 2005, the European Commission confirmed that it
will sue Poland over its failure to implement a telecommunications
directive that enables users to retain their telephone number when
they switch operators. 44 Poland had pledged to implement the di-
rective by May 1, 2004, the date of its accession to the EU.
45
Moreover, implementation of EU directives, even where it has
occurred, has been neither full nor without resistance.46 The case
40 See Poland Faces a Lawsuit in European Court of Justice, POLONIA: POLSKIE
RADIO EXTERNAL SERVICE, Sept. 17, 2004, available at
http://www.radio.com.pl/polonia/article.asp?tId=14716 (noting the extensive-
ness of Poland's transpositional failures).
41 See Olivier Louis, "Internal Market" Standards and Directives, REVUE
ELARGISSEMENT, Sept. 6, 2004, at 1, http://www.statistics.sk/webdata/slov/
zahran/rea68e.pdf (evaluating the performance of new member states in imple-
menting directives).
42 See Paul Fogo, Implementing EU Directives in Poland: Failure or Success?,
WARSAW Bus. J., Nov. 29, 2004 (discussing implementation failures that result
from conflicting Polish and EU laws).
43 Id.
44 Poland Sued Over Non-Transposition of Telecoms Directive, DAILY NEWS BULL.
(Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Canberra), Dec. 15, 2005,
http://www.poland.org.au/site/index.php?id=130&txttnews%5Btt news%5D=
1045&txttnews%5BbackPid %5D=110&cHash=1893564581.
45 Id.
46 Due to the phased character of the implementation process, non-
compliance with obligations under article 249(3) can occur at different stages. See
PRECHAL, supra note 16, at 6-7 (noting that violations may occur through non-
transposition/inadequate transposition, non-application/ inadequate application
and non-enforcement/inadequate enforcement). Failure to implement a directive
in due time or correctly will result in a charge of non-compliance as well.
For a state unilaterally to break... the equilibrium between advantages
and obligations flowing from its adherence to the Community brings
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of the EU directive on power plants represents a telling instance of
Polish compliance problems.47 The directive, which is aimed at re-
ducing acid deposition, stipulates emission standards for new
combustion plants and instructs members to implement programs
designed to reduce emissions from existing plants.48 Poland's
stance with regard to the directive is ambivalent. On the one hand,
its industrial plants may gain a competitive advantage from non-
compliance with the directive, while, on the other hand, trans-
border air pollution stemming from German plants afflicts north-
ern and western parts of the nation.49 Although Poland stated that
it would implement the directive before January 1, 2003, in its posi-
tion paper to the EU, it also requested a different time frame, one
ending in 1990, for determining "new plant" status. 50 Currently,
Poland has implemented the bulk of the directive as agreed, but
has set a more liberal standard for emissions of dust from new
plants and "new plant" status remains an open question.51
3.2. Reasons for Non-Compliance
The reasons for non-compliance with EU directives are many
and apply to a variety of industries and contexts.5 2 In general,
into question the equality of Member States before Communitiy [sic]
brings into question the discriminations at the expense of their nationals
.... This failure in the duty of solidarity accepted by Member States by
the fact of their adherence to the Community strikes at the fundamental
basis of the Community legal order.
Case 39/72, Comm'n v. Italy, 1973 E.C.R. 101, 102.
47 Council Directive 88/609/EEC, 1988 O.J. (L 336) 1. For an extensive impact
assessment of this and other directives on recent EU entrants, see Slawomir To-
karski & Alan Mayhew, Impact Assessment and European Integration Policy 24-29
(Sussex Eur. Inst., Working Paper No. 38, 2000), available at
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/wp38.pdf (stipulating factors that
should be considered when performing a cost-benefit analysis of directive imple-
mentation and discussing various approaches to evaluating the effect of EU legis-
lation on new member states).
48 Tokarski & Mayhew, supra note 47, at 24.
49 Id. at 25.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 24.
52 See GERDA FALKNER ET AL., COMPLYING WITH EUROPE: EU HARMONISATION
AND SoFr LAW IN THE MEMBER STATES 13 (2005) (describing the reasons for non-
compliance: opposition against specific contents or effects of a directive (because
of protection of national institutions, economic costs of adaptation, ideological
reasons); opposition against the EU decision mode (against qualified majority vot-
ing, against social partner agreements); opposition against national decision or
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however, non-compliance with EU directives stems from deliberate
local opposition to externally imposed measures, administrative
shortcomings, financial incapacity, interpretational problems, or a
problematic interrelationship with other political or legal consid-
erations.53 Opposition to a directive therefore may be both active
and passive, the former stemming from paralyzed public imple-
mentation, inefficient administration, or the misunderstanding of a
directive, and the latter arising from activism on the part of private
parties or resistance from the wider public.5 4
Fiscal incapacity and budgetary overburdening seem to be the
strongest motivations for non-compliance in the new member
states.55 Implementation of many EU directives seems to be costly
and counterproductive to new members such as Poland. Polish
government official Danuta Hubner, for instance, guesses that
adopting the worker-protection rules in the EU's social chapter will
cost 2-3% of GDP a year, while improving environmental condi-
tions to comply with EU standards will cost 2% of GDP over the
next ten to fifteen years. 56 Moreover, although private and coop-
erative financing of investment may facilitate the adoption of some
of the acquis, the most costly and broad-ranging directives will
transposition mode (parliaments, regions, or social partners feel being disre-
garded, inter- or intra-ministerial competence conflicts)).
53 See generally Gerda Falkner et al., Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the
Member States: Opposition Through the Backdoor?, 27 W.EUR. POL. 452 (2004), avail-
able at http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/socialeurope/downloads/2004 West
EuropeanPolitics.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) (describing various reasons for
non-compliance and shortcomings in implementation of EU directives).
54 See FALKNER ET AL., supra note 52, at 24-25 (delineating country related rea-
sons for mal-transposition).
55 Estimates place compliance costs at billions of dollars. For instance, the
outlay required to align Polish regulation of the chemical industry with the EU's
Registration, Evaluation, and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) program is
estimated at E360-600 million. European Commission Joint Research Centre, Im-
plementation of REACH in the New European Member States 7 (Apr. 21, 2005), avail-
able at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/docs/reach/ipts -summary
.pdf; see also Polish Implementation Plans for EU Directives Relevant for the HELCOM
Project on Hazardous Substances 3 (Sept. 10, 2001), available at
http://sea.helcom.fi/dps/docs/ documents/Project%20on%20Hazardous%2OSub
stances/HazSub6/it_2 4PolishEU impl-plans.PDF ("The investment activities
required (summing up to the value of 1,060 mln EURO) are not possible to be
completed in sharper timeframes not only for financial reasons but for technical
and organisational as well.").
56 See Poland Prepares for Europe, ECONOMIST, Sept. 20, 1997, at 23-25 (noting
the high cost of implementation as well as other problems facing the Polish gov-
ernment in transposing EU directives).
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likely be financed purely through public financing.5 7 The budgets
of many new member states are already taxed with the high costs
of reforms from their recent transition to free market economies
and the restructuring of state industries, and the added strain of
directive-induced expenditure is particularly acute.58 In addition
to pure fiscal expenditure, directives impose burdens on legal and
institutional mechanisms, entail enterprise costs, and may increase
consumer prices.59 Already, confusion about regulations under the
transposed EU Prospectus Directive has led to a decline in IPOs.60
The most burdensome requirements, those pertaining to agricul-
ture and labor, entail lengthy transition periods and may elicit re-
sistance from foreign investors as well as local entrepreneurs. At
the local level, additional regulations, particularly those pertaining
to the working environment, are perceived as undermining the
competitive advantage of new member states.61 Local necessity is
not a precondition to the requirement of implementation. There-
fore, in certain instances, even if the EU measure represents little
improvement over the current situation, its adoption is required
regardless of the potential cost and marginal benefit that may ulti-
57 See generally Tokarski & Mayhew, supra note 47, at 13.
58 Id. at 23; see also PUSCA, supra note 3, at 182 ("Compared to other countries
that have undergone transformation, the CEECs which have applied for member-
ship of the EU are having to add one more dimension to the multiple and interde-
pendent transformation process towards democratic systems, market-driven
economies, administrative and juridical reform, and, last but not least, the pro-
found change from closed to open societies... This additional dimension is, of
course, the need to converge towards the Community acquis communitarian").
59 See generally Tokarski & Mayhew, supra note 47, at 15.
60 See Pulawy's Successful IPO Gets Punished in Warsaw Sell-Off, EUROWEEK,
Oct. 21, 2005, at 1 (noting that investor uncertainty about compliance with the
market has slowed the number of companies coming to market).
61 See Charles Woolfson, Regulation of the Working Environment in the New Ac-
cession States of the Enlarged European Union, A Report to the European Trade Union
Confederation/Frade Union Technical Bureau for Health and Safety 3 (Working Paper,
Jan. 20-21, 2004), available at http://tutb.etuc.org/uk/dossiers/files/Woolfson-
workingdocument.pdf ("[lt is suggested that regulatory authorities in new CEE
member states may be subject to 'regulatory fatigue' having completed the enor-
mous task of legislative transposition, but facing the equally huge task of imple-
mentation with limited administrative resources and capacities. At a domestic
political level, support among CEE business and political elites for European la-
bour protection regulation, especially in the area of OHS, is limited."); see also Po-
land Prepares, supra note 56, at 24 ("The acquis communautaire... demands thou-
sands of other refurbishments, some of which will hurt the competitiveness of an
economy that needs growth above all.").
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mately be produced. 62 Directives, as a result, are perceived not
only as an unwanted burden on the national budget but also, and
more importantly, as an unwelcome imposition on the national
economy.
Misinterpretation of directives may compound administrative
difficulties in implementation and further delay transposition into
national law. As the product of lengthy negotiations between
member states, directives are often characterized by ambiguous
language that leaves room for diverse understandings, and may
result in faulty implementation.
63
Noncompliance also may imply a more deliberate element, and
can serve as a "means to protest against being outvoted or other-
wise 'minoritised' in the EU's policy process, as 'opposition through
the backdoor.'' 64 Although integration into the EU has been touted
as the best means by which Poland may develop its industrial and
commercial base, integration into a supranational entity, governed
by a 700-delegate parliament and an extensive administrative ap-
paratus with control and input on national affairs ranging from
work pension distributions to nutritional standards, has been
greeted with considerable reluctance by many local populations.
65
62 The telecommunications directive in Poland Sued Over Non-Transposition of
Telecoms Directive, supra note 44, presents one example of potentially superfluous
compliance with an EU directive and begs the question whether the Polish gov-
ernment's failure to enact legislation enabling telecom users to retain their phone
numbers after changing carriers merits a lawsuit in the European Court of Justice.
63 See Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos, The Transposition of EU Law: 'Post-
Decisional Politics' and Institutional Economy, 7 EUR. L. J. 442, 445-52 (2001) (consid-
ering factors that lead to misinterpretation and misimplementation of directives).
64 Falkner et al., supra note 53, at 453 (emphasis added).
65 It is important to remember that many member states and their popula-
tions view the EU as little more than a political and economic conglomerate be-
tween autonomous and sovereign nations. Local allegiances generally remain
rooted firmly on the national level, and a broader identification of "European-
ness" and European interest remains elusive. To quote Louise Weiss' opening
speech before European Parliament:
The first is a problem of identity, not identity in the sense of similarity,
but identity understood as a deep perception of the self. The insufficient
participation of the European electorate in the agreement that created us
proves just how urgently this needs to be resolved. It is impossible to
conceive of a Europe without Europeans.... The community's institu-
tions have made European sugar-beets, butter, cheese, wines, meats, and
even pigs. They haven't made European men. These European men ex-
isted in the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and even
in the 19th century. They must be made again ....
Henrik Richard Lesaar, Semper Idem? The Relationship of European and National
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The increasing role of international organizations in the "daily af-
fairs" of nation-states and growing bureaucracies and legal re-
quirements is seen as adding simply another level of administra-
tive annoyance and relentless proceduralization to the existing
government superstructure.6 6 Critics underscore that admission
into the conglomerate is not complemented by an exit option and
that once a nation has acceded to all of the demands of the larger
entity, it must face the consequences with few, if any, alterna-
tives.67 As experienced from below, the dominant sense produced
by integration is a loss in the degree of control exercised locally
and the sense of autonomy over a society's future.68 Often this loss
of control is met with resistance from local populations, who resent
the supplanting of domestically developed legal and social norms
with external regulations. 69 Thus, the question of EU integration
Identities, in NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN EU ENLARGEMENT, supra note
20, at 179,184
66 See ELI LouKA, CONFLICTING INTEGRATION: THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 2 (2004) ("Relentless proceduralization could become a stum-
bling block to compliance as states and their subjects may at one point give up or
even revolt.").
67 See, e.g., Raymond J. Friel, Secession from the European Union: Checking out of
the Proverbial "Cockroach Motel", 27 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J 590, 590 (2004) ("One of the
most fundamental questions, yet also one of the most ignored within the EU, is
whether the EU is the archetypal cockroach motel: a motel where you can check
in, but not out.").
68 See DUINA, supra note 16, at 1. Duina notes the following:
Transnational markets challenge the institutions of member states in
very specific and tangible ways. By introducing rules and regulations
that member states are expected to ratify or adopt, they pose a direct
challenge to existing national legal systems. National legal systems are,
however, much more than a set of abstract rules: they are the answers
that members of society have surmised, at times of specific political and
economic conditions, to deal with the difficulties of social life. They
hence reflect deeply rooted, collective values and beliefs, interpretations
of problems, issues, and life.
Id.
69 Duina continues:
While their representatives have committed themselves to the principles
of the new agreements, domestic legislators and policy-makers have
found it difficult to impose on society the spirit and application of prin-
ciples that overrun long-standing norms and traditionally powerful
groups that have grown out of particular legal environments. Systemati-
cally and consciously, they have failed to ratify or properly import basic
legal concepts, belatedly miscommunicating goals and objectives or out-
right ignoring the new rules.
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for Poland and other CEE countries becomes not one of whether
but of how to integrate-with national governments expected to
champion local interests.70 National governments are called upon
to counteract external infringements on traditional national
autonomies and act "as guardians of the status quo, as the shield
protecting national legal-administrative traditions and interest
groups from radical demands descending from the EU,"71 a call
that has been taken up by certain politicians. 72 Noncompliance
represents an effective means of accomplishing this end and an al-
ternative mode of resistance by local governments whose political
agenda has been thwarted at the supranational level. In the tech-
nological terms of one scholar, "where a national government is
unsuccessful in 'uploading' its own preferences at the EU level as
the template for the joint measure or standard, it will try to resist
during the 'downloading' process, i.e., later in the implementing
stage." 73
Id. at2.
70 Krzeminski suggests that:
For most Poles, the problem [of] integrating in to Europe is not the ques-
tion of joining or not. There is rather a question of how to do it, and
what does this decision mean to me, as a person, or for my social cate-
gory, or my professional group, or my region. Undoubtedly, a very
practical perspective is dominant. But, the national identity issve [sic] is
... [used] as a weapon in the struggle, concerning some practical solu-
tions, and defending some social interests ....
Ireneusz Krzeminski, The National Identity and European Consciousness of Poles, in
NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN IDENTITIES IN EU ENLARGEMENT, supra note 20, at 57, 67
71 Francesco Duina, Explaining Legal Implementation in the European Union, 25
INT'L J. Soc. L. 155, 157 (1997).
72 Jacques Chirac stated that the IGC should
be limited to the institutional aspects, in other words, be preparing for
the opening-up, enlargement of the EU, which, as everyone realizes, re-
quires the institutions to be modified. But at the same time ... the
enlargement mustn't overshadow aspects closer to home, those which
more directly affect the Europeans, i.e., specifically... everything relat-
ing to the fight against unemployment and for jobs.
Geoffrey Edwards, Reforming the Union's Institutional Framework, in EU
ENLARGEMENT, supra note 28, at 23, 32.
73 See Falkner et al., supra note 53, at 453 (citing Tanja Borzel, Pace-Setting,
Foot-Dragging, Fence-Sitting: Member State Response to Europeanization, 40 JOURNAL
OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES 193, 193-214 (2002) (describing European integration
as a two-dimensional process of developing norms)).
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3.3. Current Effects of Non-Transposition
Despite the specter of proceedings before the ECJ or sanctions,
Poland's failure to adopt a significant number of EU directives ap-
pears, at least superficially, to have had little impact on its national
economic performance or EU standing. The Polish growth rate has
reached an impressive 6% in the aftermath of EU accession.74 By
contrast, Western European countries are projected to grow by
2.5% per annum, and real GDP growth in Germany averaged 1.4%
over the past ten years.75 The Polish private sector currently pro-
duces more than 60% of GDP, inflation has dropped from 249% in
1990 to 14.5%,76 and the 2004 budget deficit amounted to only 4.8%
of GDP.77 This rapid pace of development will help boost the pur-
chasing power of the national currency, which reached around 50%
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD') average in 2005.78 Poland also proved to be the fastest
growing exporter among all EU countries with 26% growth rate in
2004 and exports amounting to $35.3 billion.79
Due to current EU members' inefficient labor markets, GDP per
capita lags behind the United States, for instance, by 25%.80 Per-
versely, Poland's rapid growth rates offer the possibility of healthy
new markets for Western European companies and have even reg-
istered discomfort among current EU members about competition
from CEEs.81 On the one hand, European integration was sought
74 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE 2004, at 32
(2004) [hereinafter POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE] ("Real GDP rose by 1.4% in 2002
and then accelerated to 3.8% in 2003 and to 6.5% in the first half of 2004."); see also
Opinion of 5 July 2004 on the Convergence Programme of Poland, 2004-2007, 2004 O.J.
(C 320) 8, 15 (projecting an annual GDP growth rate of 5.6% in 2006 and 2007).
75 Peter Verburg, Rising in the East, CANADIAN Bus., July 19-Aug. 15, 2004, at
21, 21.
76 Poland Prepares for Europe, supra note 56, at 24.
77 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, POLAND: COUNTRY REPORT JUNE 2005, at 32
(2005)
78 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD-),
Purchasing Power Parities 4, Paris, Jan. 11, 2005, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/62/34256773.pdf.
79 WATO Names Poland as Fastest Growing Exporter of All EU Countries, WORLD
TRADE REV., Feb. 16-28, 2006, available at http://www.worldtradereview.com
/news.asp?pType=N&iType=C&iID=95&siD=24&nID-17868 (last visited Feb. 19,
2006).
80 OECD, THE POLICY AGENDA FOR GROWTH: AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOURCES OF
ECONOMIC GROWTH IN OECD COUNTRIES 6 (2003).
81 See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Poland's Plea to Europe: Can We All Get Along?,
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to facilitate long-term prosperity, reinvigorate the common market,
and increase efficiency. 82 On the other hand, many Western Euro-
peans are worried about the competitive pressures that the acces-
sion of fast-growing CEE countries might produce. 83 Specifically,
Western European leaders fear that cheap Polish exports could un-
dercut local products in price, that financial flows to the new
member states could absorb much-needed investment capital, and
that the mass migration of low-wage workers from CEE countries
could raise EU unemployment.84 When Ludwig Georg Braun, the
head of the German chambers of commerce, recently advised his
members to invest in Central Europe rather than "wait for better
policies" in Germany, he was denounced as unpatriotic by German
Chancellor Gerhard SchrOder. 85  Schroder's fears are neither
unique nor wholly unfounded; as many as five Japanese compa-
nies are considering investments in Poland.86 These Japanese firms
are mostly interested in the automotive sector but they are also in-
terested in investing in electronics, energy, and the trade and ser-
vices sectors. Poland's most significant advantages in attracting
foreign investment are highly qualified personnel and relatively
low wage costs. Notable for its strong growth profile, investor-
friendly climate, flexible reform agenda, and low-wage labor popu-
lation, Poland is emerging as a troublingly successful rival to its
Western European counterparts.
Not only is growth occurring despite transposition shortfalls,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 24, 2005, at A10 ("[Ploland has become a symbol of the risks that
many in the richer countries to the west.., believe to be posed by an even bigger
and more integrated Europe-Polish plumbers driving down wages, a ruthlessly
competitive Europe stripped of its social welfare benefits.").
82 See Commission of the European Communities, Europe 2010: A Partnership for
European Renewal, Communication from the President in agreement with Vice-President
Wallstr6m, at 3-6, COM (2005) 12 final (Jan. 26, 2005) (outlining an agenda for
growth and long-term prosperity based on the idea of a cohesive, integrated
Europe).
83 See, e.g., PUSCA, supra note 3, at 150 (discussing West European fears about
integration with CEE countries).
84 Id.
85 Bertrand Benoit, Schroder Condemns Job Offshoring as Unpatriotic, FIN. TIMES,
Mar. 23, 2004, at 23 (indicating the comment came in response to Braun's advice
not to "wait for better policies [but to] act now and use the possibilities afforded,
for example, by eastward enlargement [of the EU].").
86 See Japanese Companies Interested in Placing Production in Poland, 2004 NEWS
BULL. (Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, D.C.), Oct. 11, 2004,
http://www.polandembassy.org/News/Biuletyny-news/News_2004/p2004-10-
11.htm (explaining the possibility of Japanese investment in the Polish economy).
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but Poland stands to receive €993 million more than it contributes
to the EU this year.8 7 The European Commission has ruled that
there should be no change in Poland's status as a "Member State
with a derogation," when it comes to adopting the euro.8 8 The
European Investment Bank, the EU's long-term financing institu-
tion, even held its regional summit in Warsaw in October 2004 and
offered delegates brochures aimed at fostering investment in new
EU member states.8 9 Indeed, according to some, "[t]he quip mak-
ing the rounds of Warsaw in these days of European crisis is that
joining the European Union was good for Poland, but it does not
seem to have been very good for the European Union."90 In light
of the nation's current success without full adoption of many direc-
tives, questions emerge about the efficacy of the EU directive sys-
tem and whether it is even in Poland's best interests to implement
the remainder of Brussels' strategies. 91
4. THE DIRECTIVE SYSTEM ANALYZED
4.1. Non-Tranposition and Potential Long-Term Developmental
Problems
Despite current indications that Poland need not implement
many EU directives to succeed economically, Poland would be
well-served to execute some of the Union's policy measures, as
underlying problems have begun to emerge, which suggest that
the current level of development may not be sustainable without
implementation of the directives or, at least, would be facilitated
by their incorporation into national policy. Economic integration is
87 See Pietras: Poland Benefits from Being EU Member, 2004 NEws BULL (Em-
bassy of the Republic of Poland in Washington, D.C.), Oct. 14, 2004,
http://www.polandembassy.org/News/Biuletyny-news/News_2004/p2004-10-
15.htm (revealing prosperous forecasts for Poland's economic growth).
88 Press Release, European Commission, Commission Adopts the 2004 Con-
vergence Report Assessing Readiness for Euro Membership (Oct. 20, 2004) at 1.
89 European Investment Bank, Investing in the New Members: Delegate's Hand-
book, 10th EIB Forum, Warsaw, Oct. 14-15, 2004.
90 Bernstein, supra note 81, at A10.
91 In many ways, EU directives have become sacrosanct, and criticism of ei-
ther them or the compliance model is generally dismissed as nationalistic and
contrary to economic modernization. See Krzeminski, supra note 70, at 65-66 (cit-
ing a tendency to dismiss criticism of the compliance model as nationalistic and
arguing that such dismissals deplete the discourse on regulatory differentiation).
This paper seeks to address both the advantages of the compliance model and its
possible shortcomings.
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generally believed to promote welfare, increase efficiency, and
stimulate growth.92 Uniformity and integration of international
markets makes trade in goods and services easier and capital more
mobile internationally.93 "Conformity with EU and international
standards is critical for the [CEE countries] for improving their
competitiveness and gaining market access to the more industrial-
ised countries." 94 Thus, the extension of EU market regulations to
Poland, through compliance with certain directives, will signifi-
cantly simplify and markedly improve the investment and trade
conditions for domestic enterprises and international third par-
ties.95
Already, Poland has experienced developmental setbacks in
the context of foreign investment, a crucial element in sustaining
current growth.96 While Poland has excelled in absolute dollars, on
a per capita basis, it trails neighbors like the Czech Republic and
Hungary. 97 Anecdotally, although the aforementioned five Japa-
92 See Philippe Maystadt, EU Enlargement: Opportunities and Challenges, in THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 25 (Jules
Stuyck et. al., eds., 2002) ("As Eastern Europe gets closer to EU membership, inte-
gration will become stronger, especially in the financial sphere."); Daniel Gros,
Health Not Wealth: Enlarging the EMU, in THE ENLARGED EUROPEAN UNION:
DIVERSrTY AND ADAPTATION 141, 146 (Peter Mair & Jan Zielonka eds., 2002) ("The
public discussion in the EU-15 about the budgetary cost of enlargement some-
times obscures the fact that enlargement should bring economic benefits.").
93 See Gros, supra note 92, at 7 (describing the benefits associated with eco-
nomic integration).
94 Siemon Smid, Intellectual Property Law Uniformity in the CEECs and the EU:
Conformity Issues and an Overview, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE 72, 73 (Elmar Altvater & Kazimierza Prunskiene, eds., 1998).
95 See Krzeminski, supra note 70, at 93 (advocating the implementation of EU
regulations in CEE countries).
96 Attracting and retaining foreign direct investment (FDI) has become a cru-
cial strategy for many developing countries. FDI is thought to bolster domestic
capital, productivity, and employment. In addition, in the case of Poland, it often
serves to balance the current-account deficit, as it did in 2004. See Marta Bengoa
Calvo & Blanca Sanchez-Robles, Foreign Direct Investment, Economic Freedom and
Growth: New Evidence from Latin-America 17-18 (Universidad de Cantabria, Eco-
nomics Working Paper No. 4/03, 2002) (concluding that FDI and growth corre-
lated positively on a consistent basis in developing Latin American countries);
Arturo Ramos, Foreign Direct Investment as a Catalyst for Human Accumulation Capi-
tal 2 (unpublished MALD Thesis, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2001) (hy-
pothesizing that "foreign direct investment also introduces a factor of accelerated
technological change .... "); see also POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at
32 ("[Tlhe rapid pace of economic growth in 1995 and 1996 led to a widening cur-
rent-account deficit, and monetary policy was tightened in 1996-1997 in order to
reduce inflationary pressures and limit the growth of the external deficit.").
97 See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 46 ("As a result of the
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nese car manufacturers present an opportunity, Poland has re-
cently lost large investments from Toyota, Peugeot, and Hyundai
that went to other Eastern European nations. 98 A convoluted regu-
latory structure, a weak intellectual property protection regime,
and a inferior infrastructure, offset the attractiveness of the Polish
labor market and motivate manufacturers to locate their means of
production elsewhere. The Czech Republic and Hungary's more
uniform and stable legal regimens, in greater conformity with EU
mandates and comparable workforces, ultimately present a more
attractive forum than Poland for foreign manufacturers. Poland's
failure to implement EU directives pertaining to competition, intel-
lectual property, and other regulatory regimes, therefore has al-
ready resulted in lost investment opportunities and a failure to
capitalize on the possible benefits of accession.99 So too, noncom-
pliance with regard to EU competition law directives has resulted
in continuingly high degrees of state involvement in the economy.
The sluggish nature of Polish privatization efforts over the past
three years -state-owned enterprises still account for nearly eight-
een percent, compared with an average for industrial countries of
seven percent-has exacerbated the foreign investment problem
and may further impede continued growth.10°
surge in FDI since 1995, Poland is, in absolute terms, the regional leader in attract-
ing FDI, although it still lags ... in terms of FDI per head."); see also Bartlomiej
Kaminski & Beata K. Smarzynska, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND INTEGRATION
INTO GLOBAL PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS: THE CASE FOR POLAND,
The World Bank Development Research Group, July 2001, at 7 (comparing Poland
to Hungary's FDI inflows from 1990 to 1999).
98 See Constantin Gurdgiev, Same Old Story for Poland as Economic Woes Con-
tinue, SUNDAY Bus. POST ONLINE, Oct. 24, 2004, available at http://archives.tcm.ie
/businesspost/2004/10/24/story734192335.asp (discussing Poland's loss of the
enterprises to Slovakia as the result of low-labor productivity and an unstable po-
litical climate).
99 See Dan Deluca, Case Study: FDI in Poland, INITIATIVE FOR POLICY DIALOGUE,
available at http://www2.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/jfdi-poland.html (last visited
Feb. 19, 2006) (describing economic factors that may have lead to a recent down-
turn in FDI inflows to Poland).
100 See OECD, ECONOMIC SURVEYS: POLAND 54 (2004) ("Overall, in period
1994-2002 Poland has achieved an average rate of annual growth of FDI inflows
of 17 per cent which was lower than in Czech Republic (57 per cent) or Slovakia (
86 per cent) and Hungary (25 per cent)."); see also European Commission, Compre-
hensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparations for Membership 6 (2003) available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr pl final.pdf
(last visited Feb. 19, 2006) ("Privatisation considerably slowed down in the past
two years and the pace of privatisation in the first months of this year has been
disappointing."); Elizabeth C. Dunn, PRIVATIZING POLAND: BABY FOOD, BIG
BUSINESS, AND THE REMAKING OF LABOR 15 (2004) (considering the impact the recent
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Implementation of EU directives pertaining to competition law,
intellectual property, agriculture, and the environment would ame-
liorate some of these problems. Moreover, in each of these areas,
Poland would benefit, financially or socially, from administrative
homogeneity with Western Europe. The acquis in these sectors
provide a framework for useful conformity with international stan-
dards and should be implemented more fully by the Polish gov-
ernment. Indeed, comprehensive EU regulation may serve as a
blessing, rather than a curse, to Polish long-term developmental in-
terests in some cases. As one Warsaw-based commentator notes-
"[a]ll the intrusive regulation that most angers the Brits [is] exactly
what we need in Poland.' ' 10 ' Further structural changes are re-
quired to improve the economy's competitiveness and establish
foundations for sustainable development even after current com-
petitive advantages are exhausted. Certain EU directives, if
adopted propitiously, may serve to facilitate investment and indus-
trial modernization, which in turn, will help bridge the GDP gap
between Poland and current EU member states.
102
Moreover, EU directives may prove useful not only in the long-
term through their imposition of uniformity, but also in the short-
term by expediting the implementation of much needed domestic
reforms. From a political standpoint, directives emanating from
Brussels are useful for promoting controversial domestic reform, in
that they enable national governments to point to external bodies
as mandating and bearing responsibility for the implementation of
much needed changes that nevertheless may not enjoy local sup-
port. In the case of environmental and agricultural directives, in
particular, external pressure may instigate necessary domestic re-
form that has not occurred because it involves significant short-
cessation in privatizations has had on investment from abroad).
101 Joining the West: Mhy the Candidate Countries Want Enlargement, Warts and
All, THE ECONOMIST, May 17, 2001, available at
http://www.economsit.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story-id=622796 (dis-
cussing the advantages of EU accession to Central European nations, with particu-
lar emphasis on regulatory advances).
102 Even the Polish government concedes that the implementation of many
EU directives will serve long-term economic interests. See The Office of the Com-
m. of European Integration, The Balance of Costs and Benefits of Poland's Accession to
the European Union: Presentation of the Results of Studies Performed by Polish Research
Centres, at 3 (Apr. 2003), available at http://www2.ukie.gov.pl
/dokumenty/Balance of costsandbenefits-summary.pdf (last visited Feb. 19,
2006) (suggesting that implementation of EU policies will be in the country's best
long-term interests).
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term capital outlays.
That said, directives are neither infallible nor often tailored to
local realities, and more flexible and varied legislative instruments
are needed to produce solutions and regulations that are effective
in all member states.103 Especially in the EU, "[gliven heterogene-
ous policy legacies in the member states as well as the diverse
preferences of national governments and other domestic actors,
one-size-fits-all solutions are neither politically feasible nor norma-
tively desirable." 104 In addition, certain directives and accession
conditions are biased so as to protect the interests of existing EU
members over recent entrants. 105 Poland, therefore, has done well
to demonstrate reluctance in implementing certain acquis, which
appear to be particularly contrary to local realities and needs. In
particular, the Polish government has been correct in its reluctance
to fully implement directives pertaining to migration and financial
services, which are misguided with regard to their conception of
the Polish case and should be transposed only to the extent they re-
flect the national situation, or modified accordingly. Additionally,
Poland's willingness to challenge the EU's Common Agricultural
Policy (CAP) may induce much needed reform in a long-standing
and calcified EU policy. Thus, in its most optimistic incarnation,
Poland's disjointed compliance with EU directives may create
pressure for institutional reform in the EU and have a positive im-
pact on issues in which it has an interest.106
4.1.1. Competition law directives
Competition law is one area where the EU mandates and direc-
103 See id. at 1 (contending that "one-size-fits-all" solutions will create inappo-
site results for the EU's future).
104 FALKNER ET AL., supra note 52, at 1.
105 See Wallace, supra note 30, at 27-28. Wallace notes that
[Tlypically in agriculture and in some industrial sectors the EU-led con-
ditions have delayed the moment at which a recruit's industry might be
able to become competitive. Take the example of pharmaceuticals. Here
the Spanish industry did not achieve full market access until 1995 be-
cause it was too effective in terms of price competition, not because it
was not up to scratch.
Id.
106 See Peter A. Poole, EUROPE UNrrEs: THE EU's EASTERN ENLARGEMENT 56
(2003) (arguing that Poland may have a significant impact on the EU's future pol-
icy development, in part due to its strong ties to the United States and its qualifi-
cation for many EU subsidies).
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tives require recent entrants to implement necessary reform. Arti-
cle 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty specifically stipulates that competition
within internal markets should not be distorted.10 7 Article 87(1) of
the Treaty also prohibits state aid to individual enterprises in an
effort to ensure fair competition within an open market.
108 This
emphasis on freedom of competition is reflected in the Europe
Agreements as well. For instance, article 68 of the Europe Agree-
ment between Poland and the EU specifically states that a requisite
to integration for Poland is to shape its present and future policy as
complementary to the EU's policies. In particular, "Poland shall
use its best endeavours to ensure that future legislation is compati-
ble with Community legislation."10 9 The White Paper, delineating
accession requirements, further elaborated on this mandate by re-
quiring applicant states to adopt competition rules that mimic
those of the EU: "[An] obligation of approximation was consid-
ered indispensable because there could be no extension of Com-
munity law to them as is the case for Member States. Such an ap-
proximation is therefore necessary inter alia to ensure that
economic operators can be sure to act on a level playing field, and
in order to prepare the CEECs' economies for future member-
ship."" 0 According to this provision, Polish domestic law was re-
quired to not only comply with, but essentially emulate, EU com-
petition law. Poland was encouraged to revise its competition
legislation to EU standards in four general areas: cartel and anti-
competitive agreement prohibition, merger control, state aid, and
with regard to state monopolies."' In addition, Poland is required
to "progressively adjust any State monopolies of a commercial
107 See EC Treaty art. 3 ("For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of
the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in accordance with
the timetable set out therein.., a system ensuring that competition in the internal
market is not distorted . .
108 Id. art. 87(1).
109 Damien Geradin & David Henry, Competition Law in the New Member
States: Mhere Do We Come From? Where Do We Go?, in MODERNIZATION AND
ENLARGEMENT: Two MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR EC COMPETITION LAW (forthcoming
2005) (manuscript at 5, n.12, on file with author).
110 Id. at n. 17 (citing European Commission White Paper: Preparation of the
Associated Countries of Central and Eastern Europe for Integration onto the In-
ternal Market of the Union, Brussels, 03.05.1995 COM(95) 163 Final).
111 See Frank Emmert, Introducing EU Competition Law and Policy in Central and
Eastern Europe: Requirements in Theory and Problems in Practice, 27 FORDHAM INT'L.
L.J. 642, 645-52 (2004) (discussing accession-mandated reforms for candidate
countries with respect to competition law).
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character so as to ensure that.., no discrimination... regarding
the conditions under which goods are procured and marketed ex-
ists between nationals of the Member States and of Poland."11 2
Suggestions have also been offered regarding the creation of a na-
tional competition authority." 3
Hitherto, competition law has been weak by design in several
CEE countries, and the state remains significantly involved in
many aspects of national enterprise." 4 Although Poland was the
first Central European economy to enact post-communist competi-
tion law, Poland continues to lack strong laws aimed at combating
unfair competition and has rather convoluted regulations pertain-
ing to the merging of undertakings." 5 Polish compliance with EU
directives pertaining to competition has been questionable and su-
perficial. Not only does Poland continue to lead CEE countries in
percentage of state-owned enterprises," 6 but significant industries,
including the railroad system," 7 the vodka-making industry,"U8
pharmaceuticals," 9 and power production, 120 continue to be partly
or wholly state-owned. Although a handful of upcoming privati-
zations have been announced,121 significant reforms, particularly in
112 Commercial Law Ctr. Found., Program for the Action of Harmonising the Pol-
ish Economy with the Requirements of the Europe Agreement,
http:l/www.prawo.org.p/statutes/stat24.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2006).
113 See Emmert, supra note 111, at 654 ("[Ejach Member State should have a
national competition authority.").
114 See Geradin & Henry, supra note 109, at 17 ("[Tjhe adoption of competition
rules was a much easier task than their respective enforcement [given the] Com-
mission's annual reports recurring criticisms relat[ing] to the weaknesses of the
enforcement mechanisms set up by the authorities of the candidate coun-
tries ....").
115 Id. at 9, n.35 (Poland was the first Central European Economy to introduce
a competition law after Communism fell....").
116 See OECD, supra note 100 (suggesting partial sale of the many state-owned
enterprises in order to ameliorate the overall investment climate).
117 See Huffing and Puffing, THE ECONOMIST, May 28, 2005, at 63 (noting that
PKP, the state-owned rail system, was once known as a state within a state).
118 See What's New in Your Industry?, Bus. E. EUROPE, Apr. 25, 2005 at 9 (point-
ing out that the government has a majority stake in leading vodka maker Polmos
Bialystok).
119 See Poland, EMERGING EuR. MONITOR: CENTRAL EUROPE, Dec. 2004, 4-5 (dis-
cussing the recent unveiling of plans to privatize state-owned Pharmaceutical
Holding).
120 See Privatisation's Small Step, COUNTRY MONITOR, Dec. 5, 2005, at 4 (describ-
ing recent talks between government officials and Endesa SA of Spain to sell 85%
of Dolna Odra, a group of three coal-fired power stations).
121 See What's new In Your Industry?, supra note 118; Radek Ignatowicz, After
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the areas of transportation and energy are still needed. In addition
to lingering state ownership, competition in certain sectors has not
been fully liberalized, 122 and enforcement problems limit the gov-
ernment's ability to monitor competition among private parties.
Institutional weaknesses in the form of inexperienced enforcement
personnel and staff have been exacerbated by poorly drafted laws
which are either home-grown and esoteric or imported wholesale
from foreign jurisdictions and inapplicable to Polish industry.
123
Antitrust enforcement is also extremely lax, and nearly all of the
mergers submitted to authorities have been cleared by them.
124
Effective competition law is essential to developing economies,
as it ensures the existence of a flexible and dynamic private sector,
which in turn, is integral to sustained growth. Economies with
greater competition have diversified market activity which corre-
lates with higher rates of growth in per capita GDP and better en-
ables them to withstand economic shocks in the event of a down-
turn.1 25 Arguably, "domestic and internal competition provides
the incentives that unleash entrepreneurship and technological
progress." 126 Application of classical economics theory to the Pol-
the EU- Mhat Next?, GLOBAL INVESTOR, Dec. 2004-Jan. 2005, at 67-68 (highlight-
ing the recent privatization of PKO BP and the government's announcement that
the privatization process would be accelerated significantly in the coming years).
See also Poland: More Policy Jitters .... EMERGING MARKETS MONITOR, Nov. 28, 2005,
at 17 (describing the recent privatization of gas monopoly PGNiG and calls to re-
nationalize the enterprise). But see Pulawy's Successful IPO Gets Punished in War-
saw Sell-Off, EUROWEEK, Oct. 21, 2005, at 1 (noting that the precipitous decline in
prices following the fertilizer company's privatization and IPO could discourage
further privatization in the near future).
122 See Regulatory Developments: Poland, Master Report, July 1999, available at
http://www.eu-esis.org/esis2reg/PLregl.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (depicting the
progress of market liberalization in the telecom arena).
123 See Geradin & Henry, supra note 109, at 30 (explaining that while Poland's
competition laws have evolved, there still remains much inefficiency).
124 See id. at 18 ("[T]he high rate of merger clearances is linked to a slack atti-
tude on the competition authorities' part in the enforcement of merger control.").
125 See Ajit Singh, Competition and Competition Policy in Emerging Markets:
International and Developmental Dimensions 8-9 (UNCTAD & Harvard Univ.
Center for Int'l Dev., G-24 Discussion Paper Series No. 18, 2002), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdsmdpbg2418_en.pdf (comparing various studies of
the effect of competition policy on economic success); see also Maria Vagliasindi,
Competition Across Transition Economies: An Enterprise-Level Analysis of the Main
Policy and Structural Determinants 6-12 (European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Working Paper No. 68, Dec. 2001), available at
http://www.ebrd.com/pubs/econo/wp0068.pdf (delineating practical difficulties in im-
plementing effective competition practices).
126 See Singh, supra note 125, at 7-8 (referencing the 1991 World Bank Report
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ish situation suggests that the harmonization of competition law
and the privatization of remaining inefficient state-owned enter-
prises will hasten modernization and increase productivity and ef-
ficiency in sectors, such as industrial manufacturing, that have re-
mained stagnant despite recent increases in growth. 127 One of
Poland's major and continuing derogations with EU competition
policy is its use of state aid to prop up lagging industries, such as
coal. 28 Compliance with the EU requirement that member-state
aid must be proportionate to the cost of services and cannot im-
pede cross-border trade would remedy Poland's misguided protec-
tionism of inefficient industries. 29 In addition, Poland's current
weak competition law will stymie continued development by exac-
erbating existing entry barriers for foreign investment and concen-
trating dominant market share, which may be difficult to reallo-
cate, with a conglomerate of government-assisted corporations.130
Greater Polish compliance and enforcement of articles 81 and 82,
Regulation 139/2004,131 and Directive 96/92/EC132 (through, for
that provided the intellectual basis for the Washington Consensus).
127 In particular, Poland would do well to comply with its commitment to
privatize and restructure the steel industry by 2006. See Janne Kankanen, Acces-
sion Negotiations Brought to Successful Conclusion, COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER
(European Commission, Brussels, Belgium), Spring 2003, at 26-28 (mentioning
CEE commitments to ongoing reforms in competition laws).
128 See Youri Devuyst, EU Enlargement and Competition Policy: Where Are We
Now?, COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER, Feb. 2002, at 3-5, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/publications/cpn/cpn2002-1.pdf (not-
ing CEE compliance shortcomings with regard to EU competition policy).
129 See Alasdair Murray, Policing Public Sector Aid, CER BULLETIN, available at
http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/34_-murray.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (un-
derscoring the importance of limiting and monitoring public aid to certain mem-
ber-state industries).
130 See MICHAL S. GAL, COMPETITION POLICY FOR SMALL MARKET ECONOMIES 195
(2003) (discussing the reduced investment incentives resulting from a strict
merger control policy that limits the ability of a firm to take over a more ineffi-
cient one). See also Another Week, Another Scandal, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2004 at
51 (noting that Poland's richest business, Jan Kulczyk, is a private investor in the
partly state-owned oil company, PKN Orlen); FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS: POLAND
396 (2004) available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library
/ReportsPublications/2004/2004 National_TradeEstimate/2004_NTEReport/
asset.upload file962_4792.pdf ("Problems with the public procurement process in
Poland are common .... The domestic performance section of the state-owned
enterprise law requires 50 percent domestic content and gives domestic bidders a
20 percent price preference.").
131 See Council Regulation 139/2004, art. 81-82, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1 (giving the
Community the objective of instituting "a system ensuring that the internal mar-
ket is not distorted.., in accordance with the principle of an open market econ-
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instance, more thorough scrutiny of proposed mergers) would re-
duce market-share concentrations and lessen entry barriers for po-
tentially competitive domestic and foreign enterprises. Similarly,
the adjustment of the Polish corporate taxation structure to con-
form with that of the EU would simplify accounting requirements
and stimulate investment.
133
4.1.2. Intellectual property directives
As with competition, a superficial impression of CEE compli-
ance with EU directives in the field of intellectual property is be-
lied by more in-depth scrutiny.1 34 Polish non-compliance generally
occurs in the realm of implementation, and innovators can expect
little protection from a relatively thinly staffed Patent Office,
which, rather than the judiciary, is largely responsible for enforce-
ment of patent claims. 35 In addition, certain shortfalls in the adap-
tation of EU directives into Polish law mean that the latter are
slightly less precise, comprehensive, and reliable than the for-
mer.136
But, Polish non-compliance in the realm of intellectual property
has gone beyond passive implementation and adaptation failures
to active refusal to transpose certain provisions. Specifically, the
omy with free market competition.").
132 See Council Directive 96/92/EC of December 1996, 1997 O.J. (L 27) 20
(concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity).
133 Poland aggressively negotiated with the EU and obtained a transition pe-
riod up to 2013 for the implementation of the Interest and Royalties Directive,
which allows the interest expense deduction for inbound investments. As a re-
sult, Poland's corporate taxation scheme continues to differ from that of the EU.
See Eva Doyle & Daniel Prager, Central and Eastern Europe: How M&A is Develop-
ing in Central & Eastern Europe, INTERNATIONAL TAx REVIEW, July 2005, at 8-13 (de-
scribing ongoing CEE trends in corporate taxation that pertain to mergers and ac-
quisitions).
134 See Staid, supra note 94, at 75 ("The first impression one receives from the
overview of compliance with international agreements is that the CEECs have
largely met the requirements for integration into the EU. But a more in-depth
survey reveals the incompleteness of intellectual property rights protection in the
CEECs.").
135 See id. at 73 (mentioning that across the EU, "intellectual property protec-
tion rules (mainly patents, trademarks and designs) have, until the last few years,
lagged behind the other main Community policies.").
136 See Janusz Szwaja, The Co-ordination of Polish Product Symbol Rights with EU
Norms, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, supra
note 94, at 126 ("In roughly comparing Polish regulation with that of the Euro-
pean Union, it is noticed that the latter seems to be more developed and detailed
in subject than the relevant Polish provisions.").
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Polish Government has refused to adopt a new directive pertinent
to patents for software technology. In March 2003, the EU's com-
petitiveness council agreed on a proposal for a European commu-
nity patent, pertaining to software, which would be applicable to
member and accession states. 37 The law would provide a com-
pany with community-wide protection for its computer-
implemented inventions through a single patent and reduce the
cost and bureaucratic hassle of registering the innovation in the
EU. 138 During a Cabinet session on November 16, 2004, the Polish
government announced that it would not support the measure or
administer the EU directive that implements the law.139 The gov-
ernment opined that computer programs or any fragments thereof
should simply not be patented. 140 As a result of Poland's refusal to
support or comply with the measure, the EU was forced to table
the legislation and offer a compromise provision.141
Poland's opposition to the software patent offers an instance
where the country was correct to balk against EU legal mandates
and has earned its leaders considerable praise.142 Several commen-
tators have argued that the EU measure was an instrument prom-
ulgated by powerful software lobbies who sought to secure their
power and a monopoly on computer-implemented inventions in
the European market. 43 The European Association of Craft, Small,
and Medium-Sized Enterprises ("UEAPME"), for instance, regis-
tered its opposition to the directive as a measure that "would rein-
force monopolisation in the software sector and act as a barrier to
137 See Mauro Paiano & Ann Critchell-Ward, The Harmonization of Intellectual
Property Rights Throughout the European Union, N.J. LAW., Oct. 2003, at 36, 37 (de-
scribing EU intellectual property law).
138 Id.
139 See Lucy Sherriff, Poland Scuppers EU Software Patent Directive, THE
REGISTER, Nov. 18, 2004 (noting Poland's opposition to European software patent
directive).
140 Id.
141 See Clash Over Software Patents, Bus. EuR., Mar. 16-31, 2005, at 10-11 (dis-
cussing Poland's opposition to the idea of harmonizing national patent measures
and the political debate that it produced).
142 See Jim Rapoza, Poland's Patent Pause, eWEEK, Feb. 14, 2005, at 52 ("[T]he
reason I want to cheer and thank Poland is because of its efforts in the war against
software patents.").
143 See id. ("Poland delayed the process enough that software patent oppo-
nents could lobby their representatives to vote against software patents."). See
also Clash Over Software Patents, supra note 141, at 10 (describing the power effect
of lobbyists in pressuring the European Parliament to amend its original pro-
posal).
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innovation by SMEs." 144 It and other groups hailed Poland's oppo-
sition to the measure as a heroic stance against domination of the
software industry by corporate monoliths and for innovation by
new and developing entrepreneurs.
While Poland's opposition to the software patent directive was
arguably laudable, the country's reluctance to implement EU intel-
lectual property directives is not limited to the realm of computer
technology and not always praiseworthy. Indeed, Poland's short-
comings in implementation have resulted in several hotly con-
tested disputes between international drug manufacturers and
domestic purveyors of generic substitutes. Polish manufacturers,
and, to an extent, Poland's government, heavily favor domestic
production of generic drugs, while the EU's intellectual property
standards offer pharmaceutical innovators strong protection and
limit copycat manufacture. Thus far, Polish manufacture and dis-
tribution of domestically engineered copies of name-brand drugs
has been unrestrained, and generic drugs account for two-thirds of
all prescriptions dispensed in Poland.145 The conflict between EU
requirements and Polish standards has come to a head with a ge-
neric version of Viagra, named Maxigra, which Pfizer is attempting
to keep from Polish shelves.1 46 Eli Lilly, in a similar move, has re-
cently brought suit against Polish generic drug company Adamed
for infringement of its patent on Zyprexa.
147
In declining to adequately implement EU directives pertaining
to intellectual property, the Polish government is misguidedly pri-
oritizing short-term over long-term interests and those of domestic
producers over foreign investors. The advantages of a strong intel-
lectual property regime extend beyond the realm of pharmaceuti-
cals and pertain to development more generally. Specifically, as
one commentator notes, "[c]ertainty in the perfection, enforcement,
144 Clash Over Software Patents, supra note 141, at 11.
145 See Screwing the Brand Names, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 2004 at 67-68 (noting
the proliferation of generic drugs in Poland and the conflict with EU standards
that this is creating).
146 See Legal Battle Looms Over Polish Imitation of Viagra, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct.
6, 2004. In light of a recent decision holding Pfizer's patent on Viagra invalid, on
the grounds that it did not disclose sufficient information about its active ingredi-
ent to determine novelty, the company's actions against Polish generic manufac-
turers may prove unsuccessful. See Thwarting Counterfeiting Takes Special Process-
ing Savvy, MODERN PLASTICS WORLDWIDE, Apr. 1, 2005 (presenting the case in favor
of strong intellectual property protection and anti-counterfeiting operations).
147 See Screwing the Brand Names, supra note 145, at 68.
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transfer and economic benefits of rights in technology are critical to
any decision-maker contemplating investment in the U.S. and
abroad."148 So too, Edwin Mansfield found in a survey of U.S.-
based firms that the strength of a country's intellectual property
protection regime had a substantial impact on corporate invest-
ment decisions.149 Strong protection of intellectual property inter-
ests is an important precursor of corporate investment in foreign
production facilities, which boast top-notch technological knowl-
edge and require highly skilled labor. Thus, the structure of a na-
tion's intellectual property rights regime not only influences in-
vestment behavior in general, but also investment in human capital
and research and development. 150 These advances in technology
and labor skill often spill over from one industrial sector to others
and can be leveraged by a developing country to improve its do-
mestic production capabilities.'5 ' A strong intellectual property
rights regime also makes sense on a macroeconomic level, as it
doubles growth potential by creating an incentive structure for in-
novation and distributing knowledge across industries. 5 2
Thus, if Poland is interested in increasing FDI inflows and
technology transfer, the country must strengthen its commitment
to the universal scheme of intellectual property rights endorsed by
the EU.153 More consistent implementation of EU intellectual
148 Michael D. White, Considerations for Protection of Technology Created in East-
ern Europe, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, su-
pra note 94, at 17, 19; see also NIKOLAUS THuMM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS:
NATIONAL SYSTEMS AND HARMONISATION IN EUROPE 2 (2000) ("For international
firms the maintenance and protection of their technological assets is essential.").
149 See Edwin Mansfield, Intellectual Property Protection, Foreign Direct Invest-
ment, and Technology Transfer, at vii (International Finance Corporation Discussion
Paper No. 19, 1994), available at http://www.bvindecopi.gob.pe/
colec/emansfield2.pdf. ("[W]e find that the strength or weakness of a country's
system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect, par-
ticularly in high-technology industries, on the kinds of technology transferred by
many U.S. firms to that country. Also, this factor seems to influence the composi-
tion and extent of U.S. direct investment there ... ").
150 See THUMM, supra note 148, at 131 (discussing the economic effects of intel-
lectual property rights).
151 See DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE DEVELOPMENT? xi (Theo-
dore H. Moran et al. eds., 2005) ("New data from industry surveys document
many examples of positive spillovers (or externalities) - that is, benefits to the host
economy beyond what can be captured by the foreign investors themselves.")
152 See id. at 130 (identifying intellectual property rights as a mechanism for
economic growth).
153 See DWIGHT H. PERKINS ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF DEVELOPMENT 93 (5th ed.
2001) (elucidating factors relevant to stimulate investment in developing econo-
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property directives will enhancement Poland's attractiveness to
technologically advanced foreign manufacturers and make them
more likely to direct investment monies and locate production fa-
cilities in the country. The resulting increase in FDI may prove es-
sential to enhancing Polish R&D capabilities and in bolstering the
country's standing in telecommunications, software development,
and other technologically sophisticated industries. The intellectual
property regime endorsed by the EU favors market access over the
protection of proprietary information that may block such access,
and therefore offers a suitable equilibrium for Poland. 154 Enforce-
ment of EU directives should prove sufficient to protect Polish
domestic manufacturing interests on the one hand, while enabling
foreign investment on the other hand.
4.1.3. Environmental directives
Another area in which EU directives have expedited much-
needed domestic change, but where much still remains to be done,
is the field of environmental protection in Poland. As was the case
with most other Soviet bloc countries, the post-Communist Polish
government inherited an environment that had been ravaged by
industrial pollutants. Neglect of environmental matters, biased in-
dustrial and agricultural policies, and wasteful handling of natural
resources all combined to wreak considerable damage on the Pol-
ish landscape. 155 In 1991, Poland designated five official ecological
disaster areas.156 The most egregious of these was in Poland's Ka-
mies). Research suggests that success in securing FDI is attributable to the interre-
lation of several factors, including: standardized "national treatment" regardless
of country of origin; the existence of a relatively sound commercial code; trans-
parent intellectual property and tariff procedures; and the adoption of an under-
standable and fair tax code. See Michael A. Geist, Toward a General Agreement on
the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment, 26 LAw & POL'Y INT'L. Bus. 673, 709
(1995) (considering various policy measures and their utility in attracting foreign
direct investment).
154 See Meg Buckley, Note, Licensing Intellectual Property: Competition and Defi-
nitions of Abuse of a Dominant Position in the United States and the European Union, 29
BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 797, 797 (2004) (noting that a strong intellectual property regime
will nonetheless protect domestic interests).
155 See EuR. COMM'N., THE IMPACT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COUNTRIES OF
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE ON THE COMMUNITY TERRITORY 57-63 (1996) (sum-
marizing environmental and energy problems in the region).
156 See Environmental Conditions and Crises, All Reference Country Guide-
Poland, available at http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/poland/
poland70.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (noting the designation of a handful of
environmental disaster areas).
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towice district, which comprises only about 2.1% of the country,
but accounted for as much as 20%-25% of the country's total emis-
sions of sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxides, and dust. 15 7 The region was
known as "the Black Triangle" and was "home to the largest basin
of brown coal in Europe." 158 The emission of large amounts of pol-
lutants in the region has produced severe acid rain and resulted in
significant health problems among the population. 5 9 The death
rate for men in Katowice between the ages of 30 and 59 exceeded
the national average by 40%, children are usually born under-
weight, and the occurrence of birth defects in the region was up to
60% higher than Poland's average. 160 The situation was not limited
to Katowice, however, as a 1990 report found that 65% of Poland's
river water was so contaminated that it corroded equipment when
used in industry, about half of Poland's lakes had been damaged
by acid rain, and 95% of the country's river water was considered
undrinkable.
161
The environmental ravage proved problematic with regard to
Polish accession to the EU. Not only was the Polish environment
in an inferior state compared to its Western neighbors, but more
importantly, EU environmental standards are considerably higher
than traditional domestic Polish mandates. Moreover, Poland's
environmental sector was extremely understaffed due to low sala-
ries and a half-hearted commitment to monitoring infrastructure in
the air and water sectors. 162 As one commentator notes, "[an EC
directive demanding the centralized, uniform application of new
principles of air pollution control ask[s] in effect for an administra-
tive revolution". 163 In addition, estimates placed the cost of com-
pliance with EU environmental directives at €110 billion, an exorbi-
157 Greennature.com, Air Pollution in Poland, (Jan. 24, 2005),
http://www.greennature.com/article505.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (describ-
ing air pollution problems in Poland).
158 Id.
159 Id. The city of Cracow also has the highest infant mortality rate in Poland
at 26 per 1,000 children. Poland's Environment, NEW INTERNATIONALIST, Mar. 1986,
available at http://www.newint.org/issue157/facts.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2006)
(detailing Polish environmental successes and failures).
160 Greennature.com, supra note 157.
161 See Environmental Conditions and Crises, supra note 156 (revealing the
spreading pestilence of pollution throughout Poland).
162 Anne Marie Sciberras, Challenges for the Accession Countries in the EU's En-
vironmental Field, EIPASCOPE, No. 2002/3, at 15, 15 (2002), available at
http://www.eipa.nl/cms/repository/eipascope/scop2002_3_4.pdf.
163 See DUINA, supra note 16 at 2.
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tant amount for cash-strapped Poland.164 Negotiations between
the EU and Poland over environmental directives were heated,
largely due to the considerable financial expenditures that compli-
ance would involve.165 Ultimately, a compromise was reached
whereby Poland was required to strive towards EU environmental
standards through compliance with directives. However, the
number of environmental requirements imposed was reduced
modestly and implementation timetables were extended to as late
as 2012 in certain areas.1
66
The main regulation harmonizing Polish and EU law is the En-
vironmental Protection Law Act of April 27, 2001.167 The Act ap-
proximates EU legislative measures with regard to public access to
environmental information, waste management concerns, envi-
ronmental protection liability, and environmental impact analyses
and assessments, among other issues. 168 The Act also implements
Directive 96/61, the EU's Integrated Pollution Prevention and Con-
trol (IPPC) Directive, which requires all member states to limit all
emissions of gases, dust and sewage using "best available" tech-
164 See Sciberras, supra note 162, at 15 (citing the extreme cost of compliance
with EU environmental policies).
165 Id.
166 Poland obtained nine transitional periods for the implementation of envi-
ronmental directives. As explained by Jerzy Sommer:
[Poland was] allow[ed] to implement the following directives after the
term of accession: 99/33/EC relating to a reduction in the sulphur con-
tent of certain liquid fuels (4 years term), 94/63/EC on the control of
volatile organic compound (VOC) emissions resulting from the storage
of petrol and its distribution from terminals to service station (3 years
term), 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste (5 years term),
99/31/EC on landfill waste (10 years term), 259/93/EEC on supervision
and control of shipments of waste within, into and out of the European
Community (5 years term), 91/271.EEC concerning urban waste water
treatment (5 and 10 years term depending on the size of the agglomera-
tion), 76/464/EEC on pollution caused by certain dangerous substances
discharged into the aquatic environment of the Community (5 years term
for certain substances), 96/61/EC concerning integrated pollution pre-
vention and control (8 years term for existing plants), 97/43/ Euroatom
on health of individuals against the dangers of ionising protection in re-
lation to medical exposure (4 years term).
Sommer, supra note 12, at 37.
167 See Jan Bo & Konrad Nowacki, The Harmonization of Polish Environmental
Protection Law with European Union Law, in REFORM IN CEE COUNTRIES WITH REGARD
TO EUROPEAN ENLARGEMENT, supra note 12, at 21, 25 (describing legislative meas-
ures that were enacted to achieve harmonization).
168 Id.
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nology by 2007.169 The IPPC directive is geared to prevent so-
called "eco-dumping," whereby states transfer low-cost, polluting
technologies to regions that cannot defend against them. The IPPC
directive and three other widely divergent measures may prove in-
strumental in producing improvements in the Polish environment.
The Emissions Trading Directive seeks to meet European climate
change obligations by applying a greenhouse gas reduction and
trading scheme.170 The Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment
and Restriction of Use of Certain Hazardous Substances Directives
target the problem of disposal of hazardous and potentially recy-
clable wastes arising from commonly and extensively used electri-
cal and electronic equipment.'7'
Poland's adoption of various EU directives represents a signifi-
cant expansion of environmental protection policy. Of the twenty-
seven environmental measures required by the EU, only seven
previously existed in Poland. 172 To the extent that the aforemen-
tioned measures are being complied with, the directives have al-
ready succeeded in improving the Polish environmental landscape.
Polish compliance with EU directives has resulted in a significant
reduction in the emission of air pollutants, with sulfur dioxide
emissions falling by 53% and nitrous dioxide emissions declining
by 35%.173 Total greenhouse gas emissions have also declined con-
sistently over the past few years.174 Waste legislation has been
strengthened, while water metering, leakage reduction, and water
abstraction charges have reduced the levels of water pollution.175
Much remains to be done, however, and Poland continues to
have the dubious distinction as having emission intensities of ma-
jor pollutants per unit of GDP that are among the highest in the
169 Id.; see also Nicola J. Eury, Regulatory Developments: Leveling the Playing
Field in Europe, 18 NAT. REsouRcEs & ENVIRON. 45, 45-46 (discussing the regulatory
framework mandated by the EU in the interests of environmental preservation);
Noah Vardi & Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, From Rome to Nice: A Historical Profile of
European Environmental Law, 12 PENN. ST. ENvTL. L. REV. 219, 236-38 (2004) (de-
scribing the evolution of environmental policy in Eastern Europe).
170 Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L275) 32.
171 Council Directive 2002/95, 2003 O.J. (L,37) 19; Council Directive 2002/96,
2003 O.J. (L37) 24.
172 Sommer, supra note 12, at 37.
173 OECD, ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE REVIEWS: POLAND (2003).
174 See COUNTRYWATCH, POLAND: 2005 COUNTRY REVIEW 72 (2005) (depicting
greenhouse gas emissions since 1997).
175 Vardi & Zeno-Zencovich, supra note 169, at 236-38.
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OECD. 176 Poland has been relatively slow in implementing the
IPPC Directive, and, as of August 2003, still had to issue approxi-
mately 2,300 permits to comply fully with the directive. 177 Even
with help from the Danish EPA, Polish compliance with the direc-
tive has been slow and incomplete. 78 In addition, although almost
80% of the overall volume of waste water in Poland undergoes
treatment, not all of it is treated in compliance with the Water
Framework Directive.179 More generally, Polish administrative ca-
pacity with regard to enforcement of EU environmental directives
is substantially less than originally promised. 8 0 Full compliance
with EU directives will be financially prohibitive, amounting to an
estimated annual expenditure of €22-55 billion for the next ten
years.18'
Poland should seek to minimize the public outlay by imple-
menting an incentive structure designed to promote private sector
efforts at improved environmental compliance. The Polish gov-
ernment has already implemented a facility-specific, compliance
determination option, which gives tariff reductions to power plants
that are certified as compliant with EU environmental require-
ments- a policy aimed at encouraging swift adherence to EU man-
dates. 82 That said, research indicates that market-based instru-
ments, such as taxes and tradable permits, and target emissions are
only moderately effective at limiting pollution. Optimum envi-
ronmental policy relies on a mixed strategy of "command-and-
176 Id.
177 See Randy M. Mott, Environmental Shock Therapy: Polish Business Faces the
New IPPC Rule, Aug. 2003, http://www.eco-web.com/cgi-
local/sfc?a=/editorial/index.html&b=/editorial/02377.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2006) (considering the financial and administrative outlays that full implementa-
tion of the IPPC in Poland may require).
178 Id.
179 See Press Release, Polish Ministry of the Environment (Mar. 15, 2005),
http://www.mos.gov.p/mos/news/press-releases/2005.05.13.html (last visited
Feb. 18, 2006) (acknowledging shortfalls in compliance with regard to certain EU
directives).
180 See European Commission, Commission Report: Poland, Chapter 22: Envi-
ronment (2002), available at http://www.fifoost.org/polen/UPoland_2002
/node57.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2006) (reflecting on Polish successes and failures
in complying with EU directives pertaining to the environment).
181 See Bo & Nowacki, supra note 167.
182 See U.S. Dept. of Energy, Energy Info. Admin., Poland: Environmental Is-
sues (June 2003), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/polenv.pdf
(noting that Poland has already made considerable progress in improving envi-
ronmental conditions).
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control" measures and economic incentives,183 and, in strengthen-
ing compliance with EU environmental directives, the Polish gov-
ernment would do well to employ this approach.
4.1.4. Agricultural directives
The agricultural sector presents the preeminent example of a
field where EU mandates and Polish policies both may benefit
from integration pressures and reform requirements. EU-
mandated financial outlays targeted at agricultural modernization
should not be viewed as integration costs but rather as measures
undertaken in the best interest of Poland.184
Polish political leaders would do well to seize the opportunity
provided by EU accession to implement much needed economic
reform in the endemically problematic agriculture sector. The Pol-
ish agricultural industry is very large but also highly outdated and
inefficient. Whereas the farm sector employs around 5% of the
population in existing EU member states, the proportion of agricul-
tural workers is approximately 25% in Poland.185 Agricultural
plots are small and yields are low, while the horse and cart have
yet to give way to the tractor in many regions. 86 Agricultural effi-
ciency is on average 45% lower than in the EU,187 and "[a]t least a
quarter of Poland's milk is produced by almost 1 million individ-
ual farms, holding only 1 to 3 cows, while 50% of the milk is pro-
duced by farms in the 3 to 9 cow category." 188 In response to this
183 See generally Seabron Adamson et al., Energy Use, Air Pollution, and Envi-
ronmental Policy in Krakow: Can Economic Incentives Really Help? (World Bank,
Technical Paper No. 308, 1996), http://www-wds.worldbank.org/serlet
/WDSContenServer/WDSP/IB/1996/01/01/000009265_3961214155230/Rendere
d/PDF/multi-page.pdf (considering the effectiveness of various policy alterna-
tives in effecting environmental change).
184 See Office of the Committee on Eur. Integration of Poland, The Balance of
Costs and Benefits of Poland's Accession to the European Union: Presentation of the Re-
sults of Studies Performed by Polish Research Centers, Apr. 2003, at 8.
185 Hilary Ingham & Mike Ingham, How Big is the Problem of Polish Agricul-
ture? 56 EuR.-ASIA STUDIES 213, 215 (2004).
186 See id. at 231 (identifying the key components of the Polish agricultural
sector that require restructuring and suggesting policy remedies).
187 See Damian Panasiuk et al., Report on the Redefinition of Scenarios and Analy-
sis of Outcomes 6 (Eur. Comm'n EUROCAT Working Document D 3.3, 2003) (con-
sidering the potential impact of EU accession on Poland across a wide variety of
sectors).
188 Enlargement Poser for EU Dairy Policy, AGRA EUR., Nov. 19, 1999, at 3, avail-
able at 1999 WLNR 5585723.
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situation, the EU has agreed to provide Polish farmers with direct
subsidies at a ratio of 25% of that which is currently received by
EU farmers.18 9 However, in offering these funds, the European
Commission has said that Poland needs to make "major efforts" in
its farm sector and expressed "serious concerns" about the coun-
try's veterinary standards.190 The European Commission has ac-
cepted a Polish sectoral plan aimed at modernizing the agricultural
sector and fostering rural development through 2006. The stated
priorities of the program include the improvement of agricultural
efficiency, profitability and hygiene, the improvement of rural
housing conditions, the consolidation of farms and agricultural
structures to maximize production, and the provision of techno-
logical assistance in the form of modem agricultural instru-
ments. 191
Potentially, the receipt of EU agricultural subsidies may ame-
liorate problems of agricultural efficiency, but the assistance must
be accompanied by extensive reform of the agricultural sector in
order to produce long-term improvements. However, the imple-
mentation of needed agricultural reform has been stymied, and in
the past, the EU has chided Poland for its lack of progress in the
area of agricultural structural reform, criticizing the government's
preference for palliative solutions over long-term restructuring.
192
Despite wide agreement about the necessity of agricultural reform,
little progress occurred throughout the 1990s.
193
On the other hand, economic forces may facilitate some of the
structural reforms that the government does not seem to have the
political clout to effect. Already, EU entry has had an impact on
agricultural prices, and the removal of barriers to Polish food ex-
ports has led to a notable increase in agricultural sales abroad.
94
189 See Q&A: The EU's Farm Deal, BBC NEWS, Oct. 25, 2002 (noting that the
staggered subsidies represent a compromise between Poland and the EU). The
negotiations that produced this compromise and the calls for reform of the Com-
mon Agricultural Policy that they inspired are discussed in infra Section 4.2.4..
190 See A Nervous New Arrival on the European Union's Block, ECONOMIST, Aug.
28, 2003 (discussing the various agricultural reforms needed to bring Poland into
conformity with EU standards and rejuvenate the agrarian sector).
191 EU Funds for Agriculture, RZECZPOSPOLITA, Sept. 7, 2004.
192 See European Commission, supra note 39, at 28 (describing Poland's my-
opic agricultural policies).
193 See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 35 (noting that agriculture
remains a troubling sector of the Polish economy).
194 See id. at 35-36 (explaining the relationship between Poland's less inhib-
ited agricultural trade and its exporting market).
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With prices in most EU countries higher than those in Poland, do-
mestic food prices and foreign agricultural exports have increased
and served as a boon to farmers' generally substandard incomes. 195
In addition, EU CAP regulations and subsidies favor big farms and
may stimulate self-motivated agricultural consolidation among
Polish farmers. 196 The convergence of wages between the EU and
Poland will also promote labor mobility and will ameliorate the
problem of overemployment in the agricultural sector.197
Policy measures funded by EU subsidies and aimed at modern-
izing agricultural methods would accelerate these advances enor-
mously. Although Poland is not yet in full compliance with EU ag-
ricultural directives and acquis, the "Ministry of Agriculture and its
agencies [have proven] to be quick learners of CAP mechanisms
and [have improved] their policy-enforcing capabilities." 19 In ad-
dition to these enforcement efforts, the government should direct
public funds at advancing the technological resources available to
farms and agricultural workers, with a focus on modernizing facili-
ties and tools. Polish authorities should employ EU funds to fur-
ther encourage agricultural consolidation and promote agricultural
economies of scale, in order to better compete with products in for-
eign markets.
4.2. Effective Noncompliance
While it would appear that Poland, despite its current eco-
nomic success, would profit from fully implementing certain EU
directives, the nation's noncompliance with certain directives has
and will continue to serve it well in the long term.199 In particular,
EU directives aimed at further reforming the financial sector and
stymieing civilian migration misconceive underlying realities in re-
cently admitted EU nations. Poland's lackadaisical implementa-
195 See id. at 35 (revealing the effects of increased prices upon Polish farming
industry).
196 See Enlargement Poser for EU Dairy Policy, supra note 188 (referencing the
WTO's Agenda 2000's policy adjustments regarding farm subsidies).
197 See Sylvia Borzutsky & Emmanuel Kranidis, A Struggle for Survival: The
Polish Agricultural Sector from Communism to EU Accession, 19 E. EUR. POL. &
SociETEs 614, 653-54 (2005) (discussing the evolution and continuing problems of
the Polish agriculture sector).
198 Id. at 650.
199 See Int'l Monetary Fund, Poland - Aide Mdmoire of the IMF Mission (Apr. 7,
2004), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/ms/ 2004/040704.htm (de-
scribing Poland's economic successes while in not fully complying with the EU).
[Vol. 27:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/4
2006] EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES AND POLAND 195
tion of these directives has served it well and suggests that opposi-
tion to directives "through the back door" may create a de facto
dialogue between new member nations and administrators in
Brussels. Moreover, the failure of these directives to adequately
conceptualize the state of affairs in recently admitted EU member
nations suggests that a multifaceted regulatory model may be pref-
erable to the current reliance on externally imposed and manda-
tory directives. 200 So too, the controversy surrounding extension of
the CAP and farm subsidies to Poland indicates that current EU
policy and legislation requires considerable reform, and that new
member states may be useful catalysts of much-needed change. In
the words of one scholar, the policy interchange between the EU
and CEE member states "displays the complex relationship be-
tween [the] four themes of risk, reform, resistance and revival."
201
4.2.1. Financial services directive
EU directives aimed at increasing harmonization of the regula-
tory framework of the financial services industry have proven suc-
cessful in integrating the market for unsecured interbank loans and
deposits and facilitating the settlement of cross-border transac-
tions, thereby improving the market situation in Poland considera-
bly.20 2 At the same time, the compliance model employed to affect
this integration is problematic and does not account for the differ-
ent financial situations present in recently admitted nations. In
particular, markets in existing EU member states are considerably
more heterogeneous than those in new member nations and are
characterized by much more vibrant national debt markets due to
high government deficits in the past.20 3 These factors, and the at-
200 See Boe & Nowacki, supra note 167, at 25 ("It is worth bearing in mind that
the universally acclaimed wisdom that what works well should not be improved
has in this case no praxeological application, mainly because the need to accept
the ideas, concepts, principles, basic legal forms of operation, definitions and even
terminology of European legislation is now beyond argument.")
201 Ulrich Sedelmeier, Eastern Enlargement: Risk, Rationality and Role-
Compliance, in THE POLITICS OF EUROPEAN UNION ENLARGEMENT 120 (Frank
Shhimmelfennig & Ulrich Sedelmeier eds., 2005).
202 See Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, The Importance of Financial Sector Develop-
ments in EU Accession Countries, in FINANCIAL SECTORS IN EU ACCESSION COUNTRIES
5, 6 (Christian Thimann ed., 2002) available at http://www.ecb.int
/ pub/ pdf/ other/ financialsectorseuaccessionen.pdf (denoting improvements
wrought by the integration of EU and CEE financial services market).
203 See Christian Thimann, Financial Sectors in EU Accession Countries: Issues
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tendant regulatory requirements, are not applicable to the markets
of newly admitted EU members.
In addition, foreign ownership of the banking sector in acces-
sion countries stands at above 65% as compared to only approxi-
mately 20% in existing EU member countries.204 On the one hand,
the high concentration of foreign ownership in the Polish banking
system has given rise to concerns that the financial needs of
smaller domestic firms might be neglected. 205 On the other hand,
foreign ownership of domestic financial institutions may be desir-
able, as foreign investors bring fresh capital and knowledge to the
institutions in which they invest.20 6 Foreign involvement in finan-
cial markets also strengthens competition among banking entities
and may serve to improve performance in the long term.207
The compliance-based regulatory model facilitates neither pos-
sibility. Polish derogations from the model may assist in the de-
velopment and financing of small local enterprises. As of 2003, Po-
land had not yet complied with all of the relevant EU directives
pertaining to the financial services industry, and further efforts
were required to align domestic legislation with existing EU bank-
ing and securities law.208 Specifically, the state is still in control of
four major Polish banks: PKO BP (the largest bank in Poland),
BGZ (the agricultural bank), Bank Pocztowy, and BGK,209 arguably
for the Workshop and Summary of the Discussion, in FINANCIAL SECTORS IN EU Ac-
CESSION COUNTRIES, supra note 202, at 7, 8 ("There are, however, several reasons to
believe that the current average of euro area members may not be a relevant
benchmark for all or even most aspects of financial development.")
204 Id. at 6. Some estimates even place foreign ownership of Polish banking
assets at 70%. See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 39 (noting this sta-
tistical distinction among EU member states).
205 See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 39 (indicating the eco-
nomic realities of smaller companies may be incongruent with the current situa-
tion).
206 See id. at 29 (explaining the role of foreign investment capital in the Polish
economy).
207 See id. at 46 (emphasizing the positive effects of foreign investment on na-
tional debt).
208 See The Challenges of an Integrated Financial Services Market in an Enlarged
Europe, in IMAGE ON CENT. & E. EUR. (KPMG Int'l, Switz.), Jan. 2003, at 1, 5 available
at http://www.kpmg.pl/dbfetch/ 52616e646f6d49567b9e006a7ae525f8c7d26fa
45bcf8ab3/image-janO3.pdf (describing CEE compliance progress in the financial
services arena).
209 See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 40-41 (writing on Poland's
management of four banks).
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in contravention of the Second Banking Directive of the EU. 21 0 In
addition, the government retains the right to approve certain in-
vestments211 and has inhibited foreign involvement in the insur-
ance market.212 Perversely, this measure of nonconformity may
yield better results than compliance, and yet it meets with censure
from the EU. Particularly, increased foreign involvement in the fi-
nancial services market has produced significant consolidation in
the field. In 1999, the number of commercial banks in Poland fell
from eighty-three to seventy-seven 213, and the U.S. Alliance for In-
ternational Development ("USAID") estimates that this figure
could decline to between thirty and forty in the next few years.
214
Data shows that the consequences of consolidation are mixed.
215
The flurry of consolidations has eliminated many small and me-
dium-sized Polish banks and financial services providers and has
lessened competition in the industry, by reducing the number of
market participants. Poland's ongoing noncompliance with EU di-
rectives through preferential treatment of domestic financial ser-
vice providers and limitations on foreign involvement serves to
curtail consolidation and help the development of small and me-
210 Council Directive 89/646, 1989 O.J. (L386) 1 (EU). Specifically, the state's
assistance of and preferential treatment to domestic banking institutions may vio-
late the mutual recognition requirement of articles 18-21, which mandates free-
dom of establishment in EU member states other than the banking institution's
home state. See id. arts. 18-21 (elaborating on the possible contradiction of state
law and international directives).
211 See Stephen Woolcock, Liberalisation of Financial Services 27 (London School
of Economics, Draft Paper) available at http://www.Ise.ac.uk/collections/intema-
tionalTradePolicyUnit/pdf/liberalisationOfFinancialServices.pdf (last visited Feb.
19, 2006) (noting that Poland has lagged behind certain other CEE countries in its
efforts to liberalize the financial services sector).
212 See POLAND: COUNTRY PROFILE, supra note 74, at 41 (underscoring Poland's
insurance market relationship with foreign insurers).
213 See EuRO INFO CENTRE MARKET AccEss WORKING GROUP, COUNTRY PROFILE
FACT SHEET: POLAND 34-37 (Dec. 2002), available at http://www.northeasteic.com
/lib/liDownload/18/profile-poland-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (discuss-
ing recent developments in the Polish banking sector).
214 See USAID Mission to Poland, An Assessment and Rating of the Polish
Banking System: Final report 2000, available at http://www.usaid.gov/
pl/2000bank.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2002) (evaluating the performance of dif-
ferent aspects of the Polish banking system).
215 See Olena Havrylchyk, Banking Efficiency, Consolidation, and Foreign
Ownership: Evidence from the Polish Banking Market (Jan. 31, 2005) (Ph.D. the-
sis, University of Viadrina), available at http://edocs.ub.euv-frankfurt-
o.de/ data/ dissertations/wiwi/2005/havrylchyk.olena.pdf (concluding that con-
solidations in the Polish banking market have produced mixed results).
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dium-sized local enterprise. Thus, in the case of financial services,
"the adoption of compatible standards rather than [integration]
through mere copying of existing financial systems" 216 may prove
to represent a superior regulatory alternative.
On the other hand, assuming foreign involvement in the finan-
cial services industry produces positive results, stronger EU en-
forcement of the directives in existing member states might pro-
duce greater diversity in the ownership of financial services
companies. Italy and the recent Parmalat scandal represent per-
haps the most flagrant example of EU directive non-enforcement in
existing member states.217 Given the purported advantages of sig-
nificant foreign ownership of the financial services sector, existing
EU members may wish to emulate their Eastern neighbors by fur-
ther opening their financial markets to increased foreign involve-
ment.
4.2.2. Directives pertaining to migration
The Europe Agreements emphasize the right of resident EU
workers from newly admitted states to be free from employment
discrimination. However, specific regulation of the movement of
labor from new member to existing member states is left to na-
tional governments, and the Europe Agreements implement transi-
tion periods to restrict the free movement of labor from east to
west.218 Thus, according to the Europe Agreements, newly admit-
ted EU members do not enjoy full access to EU labor markets219
and migration of workers from the new member states is strictly
regulated. Following a period of opposition and intense negotia-
tions, Poland largely complied with the EU's "transitional restric-
216 Id. at 9.
217 See EU to Act to Prevent "Another Parmalat", DAIRY INDUSTRIES INT'L, Dec.
2004, at 6 (indicating that the company's family-owned status and the country's
flawed banking system enabled fraudulent conduct).
218 The transitional agreements allow members of the existing EU-15 to limit
the immigration of workers from new Member States for a period of up to seven
years after enlargement. See Andreas Schneider, Analysis of EU-CEE Migration
with Special Reference to Agricultural Labour 6-7, (Hambirgischa Welt-Wirtschafts-
Archiv [Hamburg Institute of International Economics], Flowenla Discussion Pa-
per No. 27, 2004), available at http://www.hwwa.de/Projects/Res-Programme
s/RP/Mobility/Flowenla/Flowenla27.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2006) (describing
integration legislation that is designed to inhibit labor migration).
219 Britain, Ireland, and Sweden excepted themselves from the imposition of
"transitional restrictions" on the free movement of labor from CEE countries to
their markets.
198 [Vol. 27:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol27/iss1/4
2006] EUROPEAN UNION DIRECTIVES AND POLAND 199
tions" on the movement of labor by updating its visa policy and
improving border protection.2 0 According to Andrew Geddes,
"policy in the [Central and Eastern European Countries] has arisen
almost entirely as a result of the requirements of EU accession,
[and] EU policy models and ideas about borders, security and in-
security have been exported to [CEE] countries .... 221
In adhering to the EU's imposed limitation on the migration of
Polish workers, the Polish government is complying with a mis-
guided policy measure that is neither in the country's best interests
nor to those of the EU. Given the rapid pace of growth in recent
member nations, which has far outstripped levels at current mem-
ber states, mass migration from new to old member states is
unlikely to occur. Moreover, even were low levels of migration to
happen, current EU members - demographically in decline at pre-
sent - might benefit from the influx of labor particularly directed at
lower-income opportunities. Expected labor shortages in Germany
and Austria soon will make irrelevant the fear of additional work-
ers from CEE states.222 The restrictions on the movement of labor
already have created inefficiencies in various European countries.
Specifically, some Western European countries are experiencing
labor shortages in the service industries, which their citizens view
with disdain and associate with servitude.2 3 CEE labor markets,
on the other hand, continue to suffer from high unemployment
rates.2 4 The migration of surplus labor from CEE countries to
Western European countries would remedy both problems, but
EU-imposed restrictions on labor movement preclude a remedy to
220 See Krystyna Iglicka, EU Membership Highlights Poland's Migration Chal-
lenges, Apr. 2005, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/dis-
play.cfm?id=302 (considering the implications of EU membership on Poland's
migration policy).
221 ANDREW GEDDES, THE POLITICS OF MIGRATION AND IMMIGRATION IN EUROPE
173 (2003).
222 See Heinz Fassmannand & Rainer Munz, EU Enlargement and Future East-
West Migration in Europe, in NEW CHALLENGES FOR MIGRATION POLICY IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE (Frank Lacko et al. eds., 2001), available at
http://www.demographie.de/info/epub/pdfdateien/EU%20Enlargement%20an
d%20Future%2OEast-West%2OMigration.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2005) (discussing
the likelihood and effects of western migration from CEE countries).
223 See The Brain-Drain Cycle, ECONOMIST, Dec. 10, 2005, at 57-58 (noting
shortages of workers in certain service industries).
224 See Poland's Unemployment Dulls Consumer Demand, MARKET EUROPE, Aug.
2005, at 1, 1 (identifying that the average unemployment rate in Poland has been
16.5% in the last decade).
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this disequilibrium. The human capital endowments of these mi-
grants, as measured by indicators such as amount of schooling, are
higher than those of countries with comparable income levels and
match those of existing EU member states, and it is clear that the
workers would qualify for these vacancies. 225
The restrictions on worker movement also do a disservice to
the overall EU labor market. Empirical evidence indicates that
open and unregulated labor markets correlate positively with
economies that are highly successful in coping with structural
change.226 Markets that are open to labor movement are thought to
react more quickly and more flexibly to changes in the macroeco-
nomic environment. 227 Given the negative ramifications of its pol-
icy on both the Union as a whole and individual member states,
the EU's preclusion of migration represents another example of the
forced imposition of misguided existing member agendas on re-
cent admittees.
4.2.3. Comparison with existing EU member success cases
A comparison of the highly successful accession of Ireland and
the less successful transition experienced by Greece further indi-
cates that pure adherence to EU directives does not inevitably con-
fer riches on a new member state.228 Ireland leveraged its accession
to produce economic success by slashing taxes and reducing the
state's share of the economy, while simultaneously exploiting its
access to the EU market and encouraging a torrent of foreign direct
investment.229 The country's ambitious efforts at economic growth,
225 See Thomas Straubhaar & Martin Wolburg, BRAIN DRAIN AND BRAIN GAIN
IN EUROPE: AN EVALUATION OF EAST EUROPEAN MIGRATION TO GERMANY (CIIP and
Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2003) (underscoring that Eastern
workers tend to be highly skilled); see also Directorate General for Economic and
Financial Affairs, The Economic Impact of Enlargement, No. 4, June 2001, at 51,
available at http:/ / europa.eu.int/comm/ economyjinance/publications/ enlarge
mentpapers/2001/elpO4en.pdf (examining the different skill sets of migrants).
226 See Olivier Jean Blanchard & Lawrence F. Katz, Regional Evolutions, 1
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIc AcTIrrY 1, 54-55 (1992) (evaluating the effects of
migration on the U.S. labor force as a whole).
227 Id.
228 See Billie Morrow, Ireland: The Road to Success, at 15, available at
http://www.lehigh.edu/-incntr/publications/perspectives/v19/ Morrow.PDF
(commenting that many Irish citizens feel that the EU has played only a minor
role in its economic progress).
229 See Breffni O'Rourke, How Ireland Unleashed its "Celtic Tiger" Economy,
Nov. 26, 2001, available at http://www.eubusiness.com/Ireland/64640 (describing
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including a measure on tax competition and resulting in a budget
surplus in 2001, earned it criticism from other EU member gov-
ernments for "disloyal" competition and behavior outside the dis-
cipline of the EMU. 230 The strategies also earned Ireland a GDP
growth rate of 4.9% in 2004.231
In contrast, Greece employed EU subsidies to shore up existing
public works efforts and stagnant enterprises.232 Fiscal imbalances
and a widening general budget deficit plagued the country in 2003
and 2004,233 producing a slowdown in the GDP growth rate to
3.7%.234 The government has made efforts to contain inflation
through the implementation of indirect tax reductions and wage
moderation, but more fundamental structural improvements are
required to increase productivity and competitiveness.
235
Hence, both Greece and Ireland nominally conformed with EU
directives and legal mandates, but their divergent means of com-
pliance yielded extremely different economic results. Thus far,
CEE countries and Poland in particular have been fashioning
themselves after Irish growth strategies.236 Poland's ongoing reluc-
tance to fully comply with EU corporate tax measures and its use
of fiscal and other incentives to entice investment from abroad may
be modeled after Irish efforts. Its efforts, like those of Ireland, may
also earn it the ire of existing EU member states.
237
Ireland's economic resurgence post-accession); see also, John Bruton, Leader, Ir.'s
Fine Gael Party, The Irish Miracle: Creating the Celtic Tiger, Address at the Fron-
tier Center for Public Policy (May 8, 2000) (analyzing the reasons for Ireland's re-
cent economic successes).
230 Wallace, supra note 30, at 30.
231 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, IRELAND: COUNTRY PROFILE 2005, at 21
(2005).
232 See Greek Prime Minister Says Country Faces Year of Major Changes,
SOUTHEAST EUROPEAN TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005 (discussing how mismanagement of EU
funds has only exacerbated preexisting economic problems).
233 See Dmitris Kontogiannis, Leader Tipped to Fall Back in Growth Race,
EUROMONEY, Dec. 2003, at 34, 51 (explaining the economic woes of Greece in 2003
and 2004).
234 The Embassy of Greece, The Greek Economy in 2003-2006,
http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office = l &fol
der=187&article=183 (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
235 See COUNTRYWATCH, GREECE: COUNTRY REVIEW 2005, at 33 (2005) (summa-
rizing economic conditions in the country).
236 See IRELAND AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: NICE, ENLARGEMENT, AND THE
FUTURE OF EUROPE 25-27 (Michael Holmes ed., 2005) (describing the similarities
between the CEE case and that of Ireland).
237 See id. (elaborating on the CEE countries' resemblance to Ireland).
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
4.2.4. Common agricultural policy
The imposition of existing EU policy measures on newly admit-
ted states through directives and the problematic nature of many
of these policies underscores the need for dramatic reform of cer-
tain EU mandates. In particular, the heated debate over extension
of the Common Agricultural Policy ("CAP") to new member states
reflects on the self-interested nature of many EU policies and the
need for their reform. In 2002, an agreement was reached whereby
direct payments to farmers in new member states were set at 20%
of EU levels upon accession and raised annually in 5% increments
each successive year over a ten-year period. Critics disparaged the
compromise as "the worst of all possible words" 238 and a missed
opportunity for reform of stagnant and expensive CAP policies. 239
On the one hand, prior conservative fiscal policies were aban-
doned; on the other hand, the new EU entrants received a small
and unequal share of the monies. 240
The monetary distributions were coupled with requirements
that new EU entrants formulate long-term agricultural reform poli-
cies and apportion subsidy payments to structural improvements.
Most CEE nations have adhered to the reform mandate, and new
member states, including Poland, generally apply approximately
30% of their monies to improvements in infrastructure. In contrast,
West European recipients of CAP monies expend only approxi-
mately 10% of their funds on improvement of facilities, viewing
the bulk of the monies received simply as subsidies. Long-term
planning aimed at agricultural reform is ambivalent at best in
many West European countries. Poland, in contrast, has estab-
lished an Agency for Restructuring and Modernisation of Agricul-
ture (ARMA), whose mandate is to promote agricultural reform on
the regional level. 241
The disparity in CAP policy implementation underscores the
extent to which existing EU members were motivated by self-
interest in establishing accession criteria and employed directives
"to carve 'model' member states"242 out of CEE applicants. In
238 OUDENAREN, supra note 7, at 156.
239 See EEC Treaty art. 33 (highlighting intensely vested national interests).
240 See id. (describing the fiscal inequality of the agreement).
241 See Ernst & Young, Poland -European Union, EU REv., Aug. 2003, at 2-3
(describing the functioning of ARMA).
242 EU ENLARGEMENT: A LEGAL APPROACH, supra note 28, at 12.
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some situations, the expectations and reforms imposed on CEE
states were ones which existing member states did not adhere to
themselves, even when such adherence might have been beneficial.
In other cases, existing EU members extended their own flawed
policies onto new member states, propagating problems where re-
forms were needed. Ultimately, the preference for compliance-
based regulations that rarified traditional member-state policies
inhibited the regulatory diversity and innovation that might have
yielded solutions to ongoing EU (and member state) problems in
certain areas.
5. CONCLUSION-A COMPOSITE APPROACH
As the EU looks to the future, it might do well to evaluate the
utility of its directives model in light of the Polish situation. Spe-
cifically, the EU might consider whether a purely compliance-
based model comprised of legislative impositions from Brussels
represents the best possible means of enacting socio-economic
change in CEE countries or if a composite model, one that ac-
knowledges the successes of the transition economies and involves
greater interplay with the mechanisms that have yielded these
positive results, might be more effective. A model that includes al-
ternatives to uniform standards, such as controlled differentiation,
arguably presents a superior approach.
2 43
More dynamic regulatory paradigms will enable the EU to fur-
ther tailor its legal mandates and its agenda to confront the more
subtle obstacles that may continue to block its goal of becoming
"the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in
the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion." 244 The biggest obstacle to
this stated objective is not regulatory differentiation, but rather na-
tional labor and product markets that need liberalization and na-
tional welfare and pension systems that need reform. Troublingly,
while advocating reform in the economies of new member states,
the three biggest euro-area economies -Germany, France and It-
aly-continue to view internal economic liberalization with con-
siderable hesitation. 245
243 See LOUKA, supra note 66, at 2 (discussing the options available for regula-
tion of environmental issues).
244 Presidency Conclusions: Lisbon European Council, Mar. 23-24 2000.
245 See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive to Ensure Effective Taxation of
Savings Income in the Form of Interest Payments Within the Community, COM (2001)
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The ten new member countries may prove helpful in this re-
gard. Not only are they growing faster than the existing members,
but ironically, because of the mandates imposed on them by the
EU, they are also more liberal economically in some areas. CEE
economies are also more flexible, with populations and politicians
who are more accustomed to dramatic reforms than many current
EU members. 246 Their general predisposition towards low taxes,
smaller welfare systems, and more competition, driven by EU
mandates, may ultimately make their economies more vibrant and
liberal than those in many of the existing member states. Perhaps
in forcing the new member states to implement liberalizing direc-
tives, the existing member states could learn from their own teach-
ings. An integrated approach, by recognizing the advantages that
each party brings to the union, would enable this and arguably
prove most successful to the economic progress sought by every-
one.
2 4 7
400 final (July 18, 2001) (encouraging new member states to lower tax rates).
246 See PUscA, supra note 3, at 157.
247 As one author commented:
Similarly, it would be wrong to claim that the demands of transnational
markets are doomed to encounter complete rejection anywhere they de-
mand deep transformations. More commonly, controversial principles
find their way even in the more recalcitrant of the member states but
only partially and belatedly. National idiosyncrasies and international
mandates then coexist in contradiction with each other, both under pres-
sure to change. It follows that I do not intend to argue for the ubiquitous
rejection of the transformative demands of transnational markets, but
rather for an appreciation of the fact that transnational markets do de-
mand transformation and that, as a result, they are bound to encounter
resistance and therefore experience differences in implementation across
member states.
DUINA, supra note 16, at 3.
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